AUTHORITARIANISM AND MILITARISM IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

CIAOPR

RS 403-75

cl^^lf^pl : CI^JRc^6T

Authoritarianism and Militarism in Southern Europe

1 of 1
OPR 403

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Research Study

A UTHORITARIANISM AND
MILITARISM IN SOUTHERN
EUROPE

■ CmifiiluillJf

OPR 403
March 1975

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Sub}ect to General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, Automatically Downgraded at
Two Year Intervals and Declassified on
March 1982

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH

March 1975

AUTHORITARIANISM AND MILITARISM IN
SOUTHERN EUROPE

NOTE: This study was prepared by the Office of Political
Research. Other agencies and CIA offices were consulted, but the
study has not been formally coordinated and does not represent an
official CIA position. The issuing office is aware that the complex
and controversial matters discussed lend themselves to other in-
ter p ret at ions 1 Commcnts on the paper will be welcomed by the
author, ^ code 143, extension 5441.

25X1A9a

i

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREWORD

This study, on Authoritarianism and Militarism in Southern
Europe, is a relatively new form of intelligence production, which the
issuing office has labelled “functional research.” The major purpose ; s
to analyze important political phenomena that are so common that
there is a tendency to take them for granted — either not to define them
at all or to define them in value terms that fit special cases. This series
attempts to provide value-free definitions and assessments that cut
across borders and regions and that offer intelligence officers and pol-
icy-makers alike a framework for a more systematic grasp of subjects
they encounter regularly under many different guises.

The object of functional research, then, is to elaborate a useful
analytical framework for country and regional specialists as well as for
generalists. In this study, ^^^^^^fexamines the circumstances un-
der which the various forms of authoritarian rule tend to emerge and
persist, the characteristic strengths and weaknesses of such regimes,
and the constraints on the development of the prerequisites for stable
democratic practice. Subsequently, Spain, Yugoslavia, Portugal,
Greece, Italy, and Turkey are covered in case studies to indicate how
an assessment of authoritarian traditions and practices can serve to
complement and place into perspective other ways of examining the
complex issues determining the course of events in Southern Europe.

in

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

I'.i I

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTENTS

Page

FOREWORD iii

KEY JUDGMENTS 1

THE DISCUSSION 3

THE PROBLEM, THE APPROACH, AND THE
OBJECTIVES 3

AUTHORITARIANISM 4

The Nature of the Beast 4

The Why and Wherefore 5

Strengths and Weaknesses 6

MILITARISM 7

THE SCENE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE 8

The Problems of Authoritarian Succession:

Spain and Yugoslavia 8

Spain 8

Yugoslavia II

Opening Pandora’s Box: Portugal and Greece .... 14

Portugal 14

Greece 18

Democratic Institutions in Jeopardy: Italy and Turkey 22

Italy 22

Turkey 24

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 27

v

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

KEY JUDGMENTS

—Although it takes many different forms, modern day
authoritarianism can be viewed as a distinctive political
system — one which generally places far less arduous demands on a
society than either totalitarianism or representative democracy.

For many nations it is, in effect, the only feasible system of rule.

For many more, particularly for those with long-standing
authoritarian traditions, it offers an easy way out when an attempt
at democratic (or, in the case of Yugoslavia, totalitarian) practice
runs into trouble.

—The societal characteristics and problems that give rise to
military intervention and to prolonged or recurrent authoritarian
rule are similar, and these conditions tend to be especially
prevalent and pronounced in “developing” countries beset by the
disruptive impact of belated modernization.

—Even when civilians are at the helm, the internal dynamics of
authoritarian rule tend to keep the military involved in politics ir a
significant way — whether as an active participant in policy-making
councils, an intermittent veto group, or simply the ultimate arbiter
of political strife.

— Thus, for most of the world today, authoritarianism and
militarism are norms, not aberrations. And if world-wide
economic strains continue to exacerbate the problems associated
with modernizing change, the chances are that both phenomena
will become even more common in the decade ahead.

— Under certain circumstances, authoritarianism can be a fairly
stable and effective form of rule over comparatively long periods of
time — even in countries which have passed well beyond the initial
stages of social and economic development.

— Nevertheless, the key internal balances and trade-offs upon
which the successful operation and stability of authoritarian rule
depend are easily upset. Hence, most authoritarian regimes are
prone to recurrent crisis and political violence. And while such
domestic turbulence may trigger movement toward more efficient
and possibly more democratic government, it is more likely to
result in paralysis and the emergence oi still another ineffective
authoritarian regime.

—As a long term proposition (i.e., anything over five years), direct
military rule has a propensity to suffer from a number of distinct

i

Approved For Release 2001 l08l$Wfi&W&toP86T00608R000600'\ 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

and potentially serious weaknesses. But in the short to medium
term, it would seem to make little difference per sc whether soldiers
or civilians head up an authoritarian regime.

— To be stable and effective, any non-totaiitarian
regime — whether authoritarian or democratic — must be in basic
consonance with prevailing customs and circumstances.
Moreover, a nation s political culture cannot be changed bv fiat:
although far from immutable, its evolution is a function of overall
societal development.

* * * *

— Succession presents a delicate problem for any authoritarian
regime. As illustrated by the atmosphere of uncertainty prevailing
in Spain and Yugoslavia today, this is particularly true of per-
sonalistic dictatorships. At best, both countries are likely to ex-
perience fairly lengthy periods of instability once their present
supreme leaders leave the scene.

— Efforts to establish representative democracy face formidable
obstacles in fragmented societies endowed with strong
authoritarian traditions and subject to the destabilizing pressures
of rapid social and economic change. Portuguese prospects for a
relatively swift and orderly transition to democratic rule — poor
from the outset— are now virtually nil. And although Greece is off
to a fa 7 " more promising start, there is at least an even chance that
it will revert to some form of authoritarian rule within the next five
to ten years.

— In both Italy and Turkey, weakly-rooted democratic institutions
are currently being tested by the combined weight of incongruous
traditions, pressures associated with modernizing change, and
world-wide economic strains. In Turkey, another interlude of
direct or indirect military rule is a distinct possibility. And even in
Italy, the longer-term outlook for democratic rule is guarded.

— The outlook for Southern Europe as a whole over the next ten
years is for considerable turbulence and political experimentation.
And while the prospects for the survival or revival of democratic
practices vary widely throughout the area, the chances arc that the
bulk of this experimentation will focus on differing forms of
authoritarian rule.

— There is a danger that this situation could result in the
emergence of new extremist dictatorships of either the left or the
right. Moreover, continued political instability alone might breed
xenophobic nationalism.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

THE DISCUSSION

THE PROBLEM, THE APPROACH, AND THE
OBJECTIVES

Over the past several decades, authoritarian
government and direct military intervention in politics
have been cither constant or recurrent phenomena in
most countries of the world. Some observers, par-
ticularly those who perceive the widely disparate
manifestations of authoritarian rule as mutant or nas-
cent forms of totalitarianism or democracy, consider
this to be an unnatural and therefore transitory state
of affairs. This paper, however, is based on the
premise that, for all its variants, modern-day
authoritarianism is itself a distinctive system of
rule — one in essence neither totalitarian nor
democratic, and one in which the military establish-
ment generally plays a significant political role.

It is further postulated that the factors favoring
authoritarianism and militarism are similar, and that
these factors tend to be especially prevalent and po-
tent in “developing” countries beset by the destabiliz-
ing effects of belated modernization. To put it
directly, for most of the world today, authoritarianism
and militarism are norms not aberrations. Indeed, the
only practical governmental alternatives for a very
large number of nations are between different kinds of
authoritarian rule — rather than between
authoritarianism on the one hand, and either
democracy or totalitarianism on the other. And if
world-wide economic strains continue to exacerbate
the problems associated with modernization and
development, the chances arc that both
authoritarianism and militarism will become even
more common in the decade ahead.

The principal objectives of this research study are
(1) to examine the causes, nature, and consequences
of authoritarian rule and of the separate but overlap-
ping phenomenon of direct military intervention in
political affairs, and (2) to assess the local and inter-
national implications of both. Although the obser-
vations and judgments concerning authoritarianism
and militarism advanced herein are intended to have
broad applicability, the geographic focus of the paper
is limited to the non-totalitarian states of Southern
Europe.

Why Southern Europe ? First of all, most recent ef-
forts to explore the sources and effects of
authoritarianism and militarism have retained a
rather traditional focus on the demonstrably
“backward” members of the international com-
munity; hence, there is a distinct analytical gap to be
filled. Then too, the US has a major strategic stake in
the Mediterranean Basin. Although there are other
regions that share this distinction, there is no
other area where so many unsettling trends and
forces — including nationalism, modernization,
irredentism, religious and ethnic conflict, great power
competition and intervention, and the personal am-
bitions of the individual leaders— are as openly and as
vigorously at play. Because of this, the internal af-
fairs of states which border the Mediterranean or its
approaches tend to be particularly likely to spill over
onto the international stage.

Moreover, the turbulent course of political
developments in Southern Europe over the past cen-
tury provides ample illustration of the nature,
strength, and persistence of authoritarian imperatives
in developing countries; the diversity in form and
direction of military intervention and authoritarian
rule; and authoritarianism’s fundamental strengths
and weaknesses as a modern-day political system.
Within the memory of living man, Spain, Portugal,
Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey have all ex-
perienced recurrent and prolonged periods of
authoritarian rule. Three r f the six are currently en-
dowed with incontestably authoritarian regimes. Of
the remainder, only Italy has clung to a democratic
form of government throughout the post-World War
II era — setting something of a record for political in-
stability and inefficiency in the process.

There arc, of course, innumerable factors that will
influence the evolution of domestic and foreign policy
in Southern Europe. It is not the purpose of this paper
to proffer some sort of quick and easy substitute for
painstaking case-by-case analysis. Rather, it is hoped
that the generalizations about authoritarianism and
militarism and the brief country assessments set forth
below will furnish a useful analytical framework for
more definitive country studies.

3

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

AUTHORITARIANISM

It is perhaps more difficult today than ever before to
group governments into neat categories. Not only are
there nearly twice as many independent countries
than just a decade or so ago, but in most cases there is
little correlation between constitutional pretension
and political practice. Although nearly all contem-
porary regimes claim to be democratic, relatively few
can be classified as representative democracies by any
meaningful definition of the term. An even smaller
number can usefully be considered totalitarian dic-
tatorships. The remainder can be divided up in many
ways. It ; s postulated here, however, that for all their
variety the governments of most post-traditional
societies fall within the bounds of a third and less
demanding system of rule: authoritarianism. 1

The Nature of the Beast

In an authoritarian system, predominant power is
exercised by a single leader or narrow autocratic elite
neither responsible to the general public nor fully sub-
ject to legal restraints. At the same time, however, a
limited number of relatively autonomous special
interest groups can and do influence the political proc-
ess. This last-mentioned trait — hereafter subsumed
under the rubric of limited political pluralism — re-
quires special emphasis: of all characteristic features
of authoritarianism, it is perhaps the most critical to
understanding the dynamics and limitations of the
system.

Although the leadership of an authoritarian regime
effectively stands above the law, its freedom of action
is restricted in often predictable ways by the constant
need to manage and manipulate interest group
pressures and conflict. Control is maintained through
a combination of repression of clearly inimical in-
dividuals or groups and conscious efforts to play the
remaining political actors off against each other in
such a way that none becomes strong enough to
challenge the existing order or even to appear to offer
a viable alternative. This is hardly an easy task at
best; and, as will be illustrated in subsequent discus-

' Professor Juan J. Linz is one of the foremost academic proponents of
the concept of a distinctive authoritarian system of rule. Linzs earliest
and most complete statement of his model is presented in his “An
Authoritarian Regime: Spain,” in Cleavages, Ideologies, and Parly
Systems , cd. Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littuncn (Helsinki: Wcstcrmark
Society, 1904), pp. 291-342.

sion of potential succession problems in Spain and
Yugoslavia, its difficulty increases with the number
and variety of groups whose interests must be taken
into account.

Directly or indirectly, the armed forces play a key
role in the establishment of any authoritarian regime.
Thereafter, even if power passes to (or remains in)
civilian hands, latent instability and the con-
flict-oriented dynamics of authoritarian rule usually
insure that the military establishment continues to
play a significant political role— whether as an active
participant in policy-making councils, an intermittent
veto group, or simply the ultimate arbiter of political
strife.

The internal dynamics of authoritarian rule also
impose certain practical constraints on ideological ri-
gidity, electoral practices, and even levels of popular
political mobilization. 2 Within these bounds, however,
authoritarianism can take many forms — not only with
respect to general ideological orientation, but (as il-
lustrated by variations in the number and type of
political parties found under authoritarian rule) in
terms of organizational structure as well. For ex-
ample, all political parties were banned during
Greece’s recent interlude of military *ule. Both Spain
and Yugoslavia presently have one-party systems, but
Franco’s National Movement and Tito’s League of
Communists are poles apart in terms of functional
role and institutional strength. There are multi-party
authoritarian systems as well: what might be termed
the "predo minant pa rty” type has long beer ex-
emplified by political practice, while an of-

ficially imposed two-party variant is currently
employed in Brazil. 25X6

Although it is generally relatively easy to dis-
tinguish a multi-party authoritarian regime from a
representative democracy, the dividing line between
authoritarianism and totalitarian dictatorship at the
other end of the political spectrum is less evident.
Indeed, many non-democratic governments seem to

•’Even though efforts to rally and organize the population may be re-
quired at certain critical points in the evolution of any authoritarian
regime, the sort of sustained and extensive politicization of the citizenry
found in both representative democracies and totalitarian dictatorships
is basically incompatible with the domestic imperatives of limited
pluralism. In time, such politicization would simply overtax the system
by whetting popular expectations, generating a destabilizing prolifera-
tion of groups seeking to influence the political process, and alienating
those established elites which were threatened with the loss or diminu-
tion of their traditional prerogatives.

4

Approved For Release 2001/08/2?°: N £ l Bt^ l 6 ! p86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

exhibit some or all of the traits generally attributed
to totalitarianism/ But on close examination, only the
more rigid Communist regimes seem to fill the bill.
For example, in all other possible candidates for this
distinction, the monopoly parties lack the cohesion
and political clout of their counterparts in the classic
Fascist, Nazi, and Soviet models. Political repression is
commonplace, but vigorous efforts to employ the full
range of totalitarian thought and behavior controls
are notably lacking. And while lip service may be paid
to the goal of a monolithic society, conflicting interests
are both recognized and — within limits — tolerated as
essential to the operation of the authoritarian system . 4

The Why and Wherefore

Under most circumstances, authoritarianism places
far less arduous demands on a society than either
totalitarianism or representative democracy. In ad-
dition, it is adaptable to a wide range of local con-
ditions. For many nations it is, in effect, the only feasi-
ble system of rule. For many more — particularly for
those with long-standing authoritarian traditions — it
oifcrs an easy way out when an attempt at democratic
practice runs into trouble.

There are many factors which bear on the establish-
ment and persistence of authoritarian rule — a fact un-
derscored by that phenomenon's seemingly capricious
record/ Among these, cultural and historical heritage
(c.g., the constellation of hierarchical, patronal, and
corporatist customs that make up the so-called
“ Iberian tradition"), deep-seated societal cleavages and
conflicts , external inspiration and pressures, and the accident
of charismatic leadership frequently play particularly
prominent roles. But in recent years at least, the key
catalytic factor has most often seemed to be the disrup-

*A particularly comprehensive listing of the characteristic features of
totalitarianism is provided in Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K.
Brzczinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. Second Edition
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 22-23.

Since no totalitarian system has been able to repress all pluralistic
tendencies, the difference here is one of degree. Indeed, it can be argued
from the slow but steady rise in the influence of professionally-based
sub-elites in the USSR that the Soviet system is itself inching toward
authoritarianism.

'Authoritarian regimes have emerged as the result of breakdowns of
colonial rule, of traditional societies, and of existing democracies. At
least one (Yugoslavia's) gren out of an infant and ill-starred totalitarian
dictatorship. Some have persisted, changing in nature and !eadci*ship
over time. Others have given way to more democratic forms of
government, often only to reemerge in new guise just a fe w years later.

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

tree impact of social and economic changes associated with
modernisation.*

Not only docs the modernization process itself favor
efforts to centralize and expand political authority,
but by fostering political lag or political decay , it can
result in a breakdown of domestic order and a con-
sequent imposition (or rcimposition ) of authoritarian
rule. Political lag may be defined simply as the failure
of political development (particularly insMtution-
building) to keep pace with socio-economic develop-
ment. Political decay refers to the actual breakdown
of established political institutions which, for one
reason or another, are no longer suited to the times.

Although felt everywhere, the destabilizing effects
of modernizing change are quite naturally most
pronounced — and most widespread — among states
that arc still in an early or middle stage of social and
economic development/ The problems faced by such
nations arc enormous. Rapid increases in literacy, ex-
posure to mass media, industrialization, urbanization,
and per capita income expand the politically relevant
segment of the population and generate a sharp rise in
expectations. Whether or not such factors as poverty
of natural resources or traditional ethnic animosities
pose additional complications, the general prolifera-
tion of nc\v social forces and requirements places great
strains on existing political institutions. And if these
prove resistant to or incapable of necessary adap-
tation, either political lag or political decay ensues.

A society thus afflicted generally enters (o lapses
back into) what political scientists now commonly
refer to as a praetorian phase, i.c., one characterized by
the politicization of all significant social groupings
and the lack of political institutions strong enough to
mediate, refine, and moderate their interaction/

Under these conditions, contending groups in-

A detailed analysis of the political ramifications of socio-economic
change will be presented in OPR’s forthcoming 7 hr Politic .7
l mf dii aftnm of Modernization: 7 he lira 'than ('a\e.

/vs a group, these countries migm nest ue ' narac icnzcd as vie -
tims ol delayed development. Whether because of foreign domination,
geographic or self-imposed isolation, the strength of traditional
customs and institutions, or a combination of these and other fac-
tors, all of them were rather late entrants in the modernization
game. And to add to the other problems they face in trying to catch
up, the destabilizing impact of social and economic change in-

"A detailed analysis of practorianism is provided in Samuel P. Hun-
tington's Political Order in (.'hanging Sncirtm (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 19681. pp. 79-82 and 192-263. CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

creasingly resort to various forms of direct action (e.g..
bribery, coercion, terrorism, work stoppages, and
demonstrations), and the military establishment is in-
evitably drawn towai d the center of the political stage.
The overall situation strongly favors the imposition of
a law-and-order authoritarian solution, even if only on
an interim basis. Indeed, in those countries which by
dint of local circumstance habitually seem to suffer
from a lack of strong political institutions, military
coup^ and revolving-door authoritarian governments
have become characteristic features of the political
scene.

Strengths and Weaknesses

Obviously, authoritarianism is far from a sure-fire
cure for socio-economic growing pains. Its repeated
and sometimes dramatic failures are evidence enough
of this. But most of these failures have occurred under
circumstances which would have made it very difficult
to establish and maintain any sort of effective
government. Effectual rule is, in fact, an elusive quali-
ty for most of the world; whatever the form of
government, the requirements are stringent.

performance with respect to a few basic tasks. Briefly
stated, they arc:

— Centralize and expand political power. Stable
authoritarian rule rests on clear-cut hierarchical
relationships. Yugoslav ext hence illustrates how
elusive this goal can be in a country where cultural-
ly and economically based aspirations for greater
regional autonomy are strong.

— Develop an aura of legitimacy through some combination
of traditional, charismatic , and legal-rational con-
siderations. The shortlived Ioannidis regime in
Greece was particularly deficient in this regard.

— Establish stablt political institutions ( i.e.. organizations
and procedures wiich are both effective and valued in their
own right). The importance of this task is sometimes
obscured by the personal skill and stature of
leaders like Tito and Franco. Nevertheless, in the
absence of political institutions capable of accom-
modating conflicting societal interests and of
mediating inter-elite disputes, a society will retain
strong praetorian tendencies. And this, in turn, will
increase the chances of popular alienation, more
frequent resort to repression and violence, and
bitterly contested succession.

At the minimum, effective political authority — the
power to promote and, when necessary, to guide basic
societal change— requires (1) the consent (or at least
passive acceptance) of most of the governed and (2)
the supp 'rt of those institutions which, individually or
collectively, have been entrusted with a virtual
monopoly over the means of coercive force. The first is
in large part a function of political organization and
legitimacy. The second is basically a question of sub-
ordinating the armed forces and paramilitary police to
government direction. Both arc characteristic features
of stable democracies and totalitarian dictatorships.
By extension, they are critical to the performance and
prospects of an authoritarian regime as well.

In practice, the form, general orientation, effec-
tiver. ss, and stability of any given authoritarian
icgime are conditioned by the interplay of a host of in-
ternal and external variables. But even though the mix
of operative factors is different in every case, thc~e are
certain general problem areas bearing on the question
of effective political authority that arc common to all.
Hence it is possible to gauge the outlook for a par-
ticular authoritarian government on the basis of its

— Rationalize and increase (he competency of the
governmental bureaucracy. This is essential because the
administrative apparatus not only plays a major
role in determining economic performance, itself a
key factor affecting domestic harmony, but also
substitutes for political action as the primary
means for assuring social order and justice. In
Spain, for example, bureaucratic shortcomings
have undercut efforts to use a combination of social
welfare programs, paternalistic labor laws, and
elaborate grievance procedures to mute demands
for politically independent trade unions.

— (. o-opt or neutralize potential challengers at an early
stage — particularly those who are members of, or allied
ivith, dissident factions within the military establishment .
/Vs amply illustrated by the c> ocrience of most
authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe djring
the past fifteen years alone, the conflict-oriented
dynamics of limited pluralism generate a special
need in this regard. They also require development
of a parallel capacity to defuse potentially conten-
tious domestic and foreign policy issues through a
flexible mix of repression, compromise, and diver-
sion — lest these issues polarize the society and

6

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

thus deprive thv_ regime of much of its room for ma-
neuver and base of support.

Although this list of chores seems formidable, weak
performance in one or another field is often at least
temporarily offset by such things rs rising living stan-
dards or charismatic leadership. Indeed, the record
shows that under certain circumstances,
authoritarianism can be a fairly stable and effective
form of rule over comparatively long periods of
time even in states that have reached a complex and
demanding middle stage of social and economic
development."

Ac i't rtheless , the internal ’^alanees and trade-off *
nfxiti n'hith the \Ht,ew if n/teraUnn and 'taf>il;t\ >>t
aiith’iritanan rnf, d* fiend are ea\il\ nf>\»t. lienee,
most authoritarian regimes are } rone to recurrent
crisis and resort to political violeiv e (both govern-
ment-sponsorecl and oppositionist). Sometimes such
tur bulenc e serves as a catalyst for evolutionary hange
toward more efficient and possibly more democratic
government. More often it results in paralysis and
the (‘mergence of still another ineffective authoritar-
ian regime.

Another dear systemic weakness stems from the
fac t that, unlike representative democracy, author-
itarianism has no built-in mechanism lor orderh
political succession, finis eadi authoritarian regime
must devise its own. a requirement which adds ur-
gency to the need to legitimize and institutionalize
its rule. Personal dictatorships are particularly vul-
nerable m si c ccssjnn difficulties. Kven if. like franco
and I ito. the supreme ruler makes elaborate arrange-
ments for succession, including constitutional pro-
visions lor the division ol his offices and powers, the
basic components of this new system are |jkei\ to lie
dormant and untested until alter he has actually de-
parted the scene. Then, in the absence of his stabiliz-
ing influence, they may prove incapable ol function-
ing .is intended

MILITARISM

Although the fact that both the conditions which
favor authoritarian rule and the dynamics of the
system itself lend to draw the military into po. hies in

I .11 -til Inn tfir world's MMjnr oil prorlturrs. ftir < one rpt of a middlr
staler ol rfrvf lupment » au lw ondrlv «Min<-d as signifying a prr . apn.i
tpNP in current prices of hriurrn S^UU and Sg.iHxi

a major way has been established in previous dU-
< ussion. some further observations about the c auses
and consequences of military intervention are clearly
in order. Specifically, what seems to be the reason for
the inc reasing ineidenc a of direc t military rule.' Wh\
are there such marked variations in the form and di-
tec lion of the political role jdaved hv the military in
dillererit countries.’ Are milit.rv regimes inherently
anv better or- worse than civilian authoritarian
regimes

I he monves w hic h move military men to direct ac -
tion in the politic al arena are usually comolcx. The
mix varies according to time arc! place, but almost
always inc ludes three distinct areas of concern -per-
sonal. institutional, and societal. Sometimes am-
bitions. grievances over pay and promotion, or un-
easiness over polic ics or trends which appear to
threaten the perquisites and power ol the' military es-
tablishment clearly predominate. But in a growing
number of cases, these considerations seem to have
been stionglv reinforced, if not overshadowed, by fear
th.a economic or political mismanagement was
threatening to lead the nation to the brink of disaster.

I he process of modernization has. j n fact, in-
creasingly affected both military motives and
capabilities with respect to direct intervention in
political affairs. Proliferation of domestic missions
(c.g.. counterinsurgency, riot control, and civic ac-
tion!. corresponding c hanges in the c urricula of ad-
vanced military schools, and the influence of foreign
ideas and developments have combined to increase
the level of social awareness within the* military es-
tablishments of many c ountries -and to generate a
consensus th.it preservation of national security
demands prompt and energetic efforts to rcmlve
pressing economic, social, and political problems.
Par. ’./el development, however gradual, of new
managerial skills and bureaucratic resources has
tended to inc reuse the- confidence ol military leaders in
their unique ability to analyze and cope with their
country s ills. Not surprisingly, the (‘mergence* ol this
new breed of s< Idier-tca hnocrut has been accom-
panied by a dtstinc t trend toward: (I) military in-
terventions which are institutional rather than per-
sonalism in nature, and (2> both longer and morefre-
qu ut intei hides of direct military rule*.

Nevertheless, no national military es-
tablishment no matter what its d/e or degree of
professionalization ■■ is .1 monolithic institution. In

7

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

fact, with few exceptions, each tends to reflect the
currents and divisions affecting the country at large.
Thus, while it is possible to catalog the conditions
which invite military intervention, the form and direc-
tion that such intervention takes, in any given case,
will depend on which military faction seizes the ini-
tiative and which domestic allies it chooses to court
or support.

Although the effectiveness of each military regime
must be assessed on a casc-by-case basis, aggregate
data analysis suggests that, in the short to medium
term at least, it makes little difference per se whether
soldiers or civilians hold the reins of power. It seems
that military regimes tend to impose more restrictions
on political activity, achieve greater success in
promoting economic growth in very poor countries,
and do less to develop primary education than their
authoritarian civilian counterparts. (Contrary to pop-
ular belief, non-military authoritarian regimes tend to
spend more on defense.) Apart from these findings,
the differences in overall economic and political per-
formance appear to be negligible. 10

As a long-term proposition (i.e., anything over five
years), however, direct military rule has a propensity
to suffer from a number of potentially serious
weaknesses, including: (1) inadequate political in-
stitutionalization; (2) a lack of compensating
charismatic leadership; and (3) increasing fac-
tionalism within the military establishment itself. The
ill-fated Papadopoulos regime in Greece provides a
case in point.

But even though these profession-related short-
comings are in time likely to afflict any predominantly
military regime, there is an offsetting tendency for
civil-military distinctions to become blurred under
authoritarian rule. Most military regimes co-opt a
large number of civilians into key posts. Moreover,
soldier politicians are soon confronted with a number
of problems — including, ironically enough, the need
to insure continued subordination of the armed forces
to political authority — which both limit their options
and tend to have an erosive effect on their old in-
stitutional loyalties and ties. Franco Spain provides a
clear example of the civilianization of what was ini-
tially a r.vlitary dictatorship.

"’Based on unpublished papers presented at the 1974 Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

THE SCENE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

Not since the earliest phases of the Cold War has
the political future of the whole u soft underbelly’ 1 of
Europe seemed so uncertain. Authoritarian Spain and
Yugoslavia both face potentially serious succession
problems. Portuguese efforts to establish democratic
rule have already encountered formidable obstacles.
Although off to a promising start, Greek efforts to the
same end bode well to run into similar difficulties over
time. For its part, Italian democracy seems shakier
than ever. And given the cumulatively destabilizing
impact of recent events on Turkey’s political scene, it
would seem wise not to bet too heavily on the
longevity of that country’s latest experiment with
democracy.

Just how serious the potential ramifications of such
instability are — including the degree and significance
of the “leftist threat” to NATO interests— must of
course, be determined through casc-by-case analysis
in which due account is taken of all significant inter-
nal and external variables. No such ambitious under-
taking is attempted here. Rather, it is the purpose of
the brief country assessments in this section to under-
score the persistence of authoritarian traditions and
imperatives in Southern Europe and to indicate how
these arc likely to influence the future course of events
in the countries concerned.

The Problems of Authoritarian Succession:
Spain and Yugoslavia

Franco has been political master of Spain since
1939, Tito of Yugoslavia since 1945. Both preside over
fragmented societies with strong authoritarian
traditions. Now in their eighties, both have
made — and have partially implemented— elaborate
arrangements for the passage of political power to
their heirs. And both have blithely short-circuited
these arrangements whenever some key subordinate
or interest group seemed to step out of line.

Spain M

In some ways, Spanish political problems are the
easier to isolate and analyze. For one thing, despite

"The brief Spanish country assessment presented here constitutes an
abridged and updated version of OPR's The Spanish Succession: Strains
in the Post- Franca Authoritarian System y November 1974. That paper
was followed by a more extensive analysis of the Spanish scene in
OPR's The Politics of Uncertainty: Spain Prepares for the Post-Franco Era ,
February 1975.

6

CONFIDENTIAL

H

*

\

\

l

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

troublesome regional frictions and disparities, Spain’s
population is culturally and ethnically more homo-
geneous than Yugoslavia’s. For another, Franco’s
system of rule is conceptually simpler than Titoism. It
is neither revolutionary in nature nor burdened by an
elaborate guiding ideology. Contrary to Yugoslav
practice, it presupposes maintenance of relatively low
levels of popular political mobilization and con-
sciousness. Partly for these reasons, and partly
because the spectre of foreign pressures and interven-
tion has not — or at least not since 1950 — loomed so
large in Madrid’s domestic policy calculations, the
post-World War II evolution of authoritarian rule in
Spain has been far less erratic than in Yugoslavia.

For over 30 years, Franco has managed to (1 ) main-
tain the unswerving loyalty of the Spanish military es-
tablishment, (2) sustain and dominate a governing
coalition of basically conservative hut otherwise quite
disparate elites, (3) neutralize his most dangerous
domestic foes, and (4) retain the positive — if
passive — acceptance of the majority of his
countrymen. Moreover, although political inhibitions
born of memories of bloody civil war have faded,
Spain’s strong economic performance during the
1960’s and early 1970’s has given more people a
genuine — if fragile — stake in Franco’s system than
ever before. 12

Nevertheless, Franco has failed to establish the
tried and trusted political institutions needed to
perpetuate his system once he has left the scene. Of all
the institutions he has created, only the cabinet has
developed any vitality. The rest have simply lain dor-
mant pending the succession or have been discredited
as compliant appendages of dictatorial rule.

In fact, despite Madrid’s willingness to
countenance a few mildly liberalizing reforms,
Spanish political development has simply not kept
pace with the changes in social structure and outlook
generated by vigorous economic growth and increas-

'•’Dcspitc substantial infusions of US aid during the 1950’s, Spanish
economic growth had been impeded — and was ultimately halted
altogether — by highly autarchic policies born of early Fascist inspira-
tion and hardened by necessity during a decade of isolation. In 1959,
however, with Spanish per capita GNP threatening to hover indefinitely
below $500, technocratic elements persuaded Franco to adopt a sweep-
ing and outward-looking program of economic reform. -The results were
dramatic. Spain quickly achieved (and, with the exception of a tem-
porary showdown in 1970-1971, has until recently maintained) one of
the highest growth rates in Europe. By the beginning of 1974, per capita
GNP had soared to $1,750.

ing exposure to foreign influences. As a result, Fran-
co’s once finely tuned system has been thrown out of
kilter — as evidenced by mounting labor unrest, in-
creasing polarization of the political scene.* along
liberal and conservative lines, and renewed agitation
for Basque and Catalonian autonomy. n

By and large, Franco’s personal authority and
prestige have served to offset this growing imbalance.
But now, in a climate further unsettled both by
worldwide economic strains and by recent events in
Portugal, Spanish politics arc threatening to reacquire
a praetorian character. And while Franco’s system is
not yet beyond salvation, the ability of his successors
to halt its erosion is likely to be significantly impaired
by the complexity of the largely untested governmen-
tal structure they will inherit.

Not only will the title of Caudillo and the extraor-
dinary constitutional powers which render Franco
“responsible only to God and history” die with him,
but the checks and balances he has built into his
succession arrangements provide ample ammunition
for a multi-facctcd power struggle once he is gone.
Theoretically, Franco’s designee for furure King,
37-year old Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon, will oc-
cupy the key positions — Chief of State, Generalissimo
of the Armed Forces, and Chief of the National
Movement (an organization which some years ago
superseded the Falangc Espanola Tradicionalista as
Spain’s sole legal political “party”). But the Prime
Minister will control the government machinery, and
either he or the minister concerned will have to
approve every decision taken by the King as Chief of
State. Moreover, although Juan Carlos will be legally
empowered to resolve disputes between the cabinet,
the Cortes (legislature), and the judiciary, Franco’s
role of supreme arbiter will have passed elsewhere — to
the previously somnolent Council of the Realm. 14

"The terms conservative and libera! take on distinctive meanings
when applied to Spanish politics. Far from simply evincing a cautious
attitude toward change, Spanish conservatives feel uncomfortable with
Francos modest political reforms (aftertura) and would resist, by force
if necessary, any significant shift in the balance of political power
toward populism. 'Thus, the whole political spectrum is skewed to
the right, and many Spaniards who might be classified as liberals
by outside observers would be considered centrists in a more
democratic society.

M 'I*hc Council of the Realm has 17 members: 7 ex officio (the Presi-
dent of the Cortes , the senior prelate among the members of the
Car Its, the senior military officer on active duty, the Chief of the
High General Staff, and the Presidents of the Supreme Court,
Council of State, and Institute of Spain) and 10 elected from among
the groups represented in the Cortes.

9

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

This last is a grave responsibility to place <;:i a
collegiate body composed of representatives of dis-
parate groups. In fact, given the growing rift between
liberal and conservative forces in Spain, Franco’s
whole succession scheme could prove close to un-
workable. 'Flu* projected diffusion of effective political
power is not only likely to widen existing cracks in
Spain's governing coalition, but initially, at least, it
promises to lend disproportionate advantage to the
political right wing.

rims, despite the fact that Juan Carlos and Prime
Minister Carlos Arias — who is expected to retain his
present post for at least a few months after Franco's
departure — both favor further social and political
reforms, they may simply lack the clout to implement
controversial change. Moreover, should the two for
any reason come to an early parting of the ways, Juan
Carlos could easily end up with a Prime Minister less
amenable to reform. Of the half dozen men currently
considered to be leading contenders for the job, only
one, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, seems to be as interested
as the present Prime Minister in liberalizing the
system.

Much, of course, will depend on how Spain’s prin-
cipal political actors interpret and execute their new
roles once Franco leaves the scene. But unless the in-
crca singly evident failure of Portugal’s
recently-launched attempt at democratization greatly
discourages Spain’s evermore numerous proponents
of liberalizing change, any prolonged stalemate over
the pace of reform will exacerbate the polarization of
Spanish society. In the absence of healthy political in-
stitutions, Franco’s successors will then be hard
pressed to contain cither inter-elite disputes or grow-
ing popular discontent. Most importantly, perhaps,
they will lack a strong and broadly based supportive
political party capable of co-opting moderate op-
position leaders and of giving their views some
representation in the Cortes and top advisory councils.
(In their present configuration, neither the introverted
and elitist National Movement nor any of Spain’s
newly-authorized and still embryonic “political
associations” arc equipped for this role.) Currently
threatening economic problems could easily com-
pound these wocs. ls And if domestic turbulence

"Even under the best of conditions, Madrid might find it difficult to
satisfy popular appetites whetted by a decade of rising living standards.
As it is. Spain's economic prospects have recently been clouded by in-
llationary pressures, the increased cost of petroleum, and the general
deterioration of the economic picture in Europe. The last has already
found reflection in shrinking earnings from Spain’s important tourist in-
dustry and in a decline in job opportunities for-— and hard currency
remittances from — nearly one million Spanish emigrant workers.

reaches serious proportions, one or another faction of
Spain’s long quiescent military establishment can be
expected to emerge from the political shadows and
attempt to impose its own solution.

In such an event, no duplication of recent events in
Portugal would be likely — at least not over the next
several years. Although a few younger officers un-
doubtedly secretly sympathize with the goals and
behavior of their militant contemporaries in Lisbon,
the Spanish military establishment — untroubled by
frustrations born of seemingly pointless and endless
colonial wars — remains, on balance, fundamentally
loyal to Franco and his system. It is, however, divided
over how much political reform is desirable in the
post -Franco era. It is also divided over the question of
what political role the armed forces should play.

A small but growing liberal minority, incorporating
officers of all ages and ranks, favors faster and more
meaningful political and social reforms — an objective
these officers recognize might at some point oblige the
military to inject itself directly into the policy-making
process. At the other end of the spectrum, a somewhat
more outspoken group opposes any relaxation of
authoritarian rule and vigorously maintains that the
military should and must assume active responsibility
for Spain’s political future. 'Flic rest of the Spanish of-
ficer corps, including a majority of its ambitious but
economically insecure junior members, would seem to
prefer to avoid a more active political role and would
probably support any regime in Madrid as long as it
seemed reasonably capable of maintaining order,
preserved the essential features of Franco’s system,
and did not threaten military prerogatives.

But whatever their other differences, it is clear that
most Spanish officers agree that the military has the
right and duty to intervene in the event of a serious
and prolonged breakdown of domestic order. And
since the direction and duration of such intervention
would depend on which factional grouping seized the
initiative and the sources of its civilian support, a
relatively small shift in the current balance of forces
within the military establishment could significantly
affect Spanish political fortunes in the decade ahead.

All told, Spanish circumstances and traditions still
favor some form of authoritarian rule. But while
Spanish society has yet to develop the preconditions
for stable democracy, it has just clearly outgrown the
limits of the sort of rigid dictatorship that hardline
conservative elements might seek to impose. In any
event, the outlook is for a lengthy period of instability

10

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

caused by contention not only between the forces for
and against liberalizing change, but among the
different power elements in Franco's succession
scheme as well.

This potential for long term instability is a matter
for legitimate concern for the West. At worst, chronic
domestic turbulence could in time give rise to a
radical dictatorship of either the left or right-— even-
tualities which, each in its own way, would pose
serious problems for NATO. Short of this, the in-
security of its domestic position might prompt an
otherwise moderate and instinctively pro-Western
government in Madrid to adopt an assertive
nationalism which might prejudice U.S. interests with
respect to basing rights, trade promotion, private in-
vestment, and the whole issue of Gibraltar and the
Gibraltar Straits.

Yugoslavia

Spain’s troubles pale beside those of Yugoslavia.
The latter’s survival as a multinational state has, in
fact, been one of the minor miracles of our times, liver
since 1918, when their country was established on the
ruins of the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires, the
Yugoslavs have been struggling to modernize their
economy, to protect themselves against the
hegemonistie or irredentist aspirations of outside
powers, and most importantly, to forge a united
nation out of peoples previously separated and set
against each other by geography, historical circum-
stance, and cultural influence. In none of these
endeavors, particularly the last, have they been wholly
successful.

Indeed, the havoc wrought by the deep-seated an-
tagonisms which divide Yugoslavia’s constituent
nationalities has been formidable. w> They doomed

" Many of these antaijonisins have their roots in the ages-old division
of the Balkans Between the Latin Catholic West and the Creek
( )rthodox Last. C )thers grew out of the five centuries or Turkish rule suf-
fered by the forebears of the citizens of southern and central Yugoslavia
following the defeat of the Serbs at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. Indeed,
despite the common Slavic origin of most of its citizens, Yugoslavia's
ethnic terrain is unquestionably the most varied and complex in
Europe.

- Five official languages arc employed in the conduct of the country's
domestic and foreign affairs.

— A third of its people arc Roman Catholics. Slightly more are of Ser-
bian Orthodox persuasion. One in eight is a Muslim.

— Approximately *10 percent of its 21 million inhabitants arc Serbs. 22
percent arc Croats, 9 portent arc Slovenes, 6 percent arc
Macedonians, 2.3 percent arc Montenegrins, 6.5 percent arc of Alba-
nian origin, and 3 percent arc ethnically Hungarian. Bosnian
Muslims (about 8.5 percent) and numerous lesser nationality groups
make up the remainder.

Belgrade's inilial experiment with democracy, under-
mined subsequent efforts at centralized authoritarian
rule, and facilitated the easy victory scored by Ger-
man invasion forces in early 1 9*11. A lew months later
they flared into a bloody civil war which sometimes
obscured an otherwise magnilieant resistance effort,
took over 700, ()()() lives, and paved the way for the es-
tablishment of a post-war Stalinist-stvle Communist
regime under Josip Broz Tito. Today, reinforced by
growing disparities in regional levels of well-being,
these antagonisms still lie at the heart of most of
Yugoslavia's political and social problems and not a
few of the economic ones as well.

Faced with the need to develop wider domestic and
international support in the wake of Yugoslavia's ex-
pulsion from the Soviet Bloc, Tito cast aside Stalinist
practices in 1950 and launched his country onto an
uncharted course toward what might be termed
pluralistic socialism — a highly sophisticated variant of
authoritarian rule expressly tailored to local circum-
stances. Within limits, I ito’s answer to the question
of how best to deal with regional urges for greater
autonomy and other particularistic interests has been
to accommodate them. For example, he has made the
regular and active participation of a wide variety of
regional organs, federal bodies, and special interest
groups (e.g., youth, labor, professional, and
economic) in the process of government an indispen-
sable feature of his political system. I le has vigorously
applied the principle of proportional ethnic represen-
tation to all key institutions, including, as far as
possible, the military establishment. And until
recently, at least, he has presided over a gradual
decentralization of authority— not only to Yugo-
slavia's eight constituent republics and provinces,
but beyond as well to the communes ( nftstina.si
which now constitute the nation’s basic socio-polit-
ical units.

Although Yugoslavia's post- 1 950 evolution has
been troubled, it demonstrates that authoritarian rule
can be (I) very flexible and innovative and (2)
reasonably effective and popular in an extraordinarily
complex and turbulent environment. It also under-
scores many of the systemic vulnerabilities of
authoritarianism, particularly those associated with
personal istic rule and the inevitable problems of
succession.

Tito’s pragmatic innovations — including the in-
troduction of what has been termed, for lack of
precedent, “market socialism" — have made Yugoslav
society the most open and dynamic in Eastern

11

CONFIDENTIAL

1

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

Europe, Hut, as he recently learned to his dismay, too
much decentralization of authority and too much
politicization of the citizenry can he dangerous in such
a potentially explosive environment. As Belgrade
eased its grip, ethnic enmities and jealousies became
inextricably intertwined in a growing power struggle
between the proponents of further liberalization and
well-entrenched conservative elements.

Matters finally came to a head in late 1971. By
then, the power of federal authorities to develop and
enforce the controversial programs needed to stabilize
the nation’s chronically troubled economy and to
reverse growing regional economic inequities had all
but evaporated. No longer held in check by fears of a
Czechoslovakia-style Soviet invasion, resurgent ethnic
rivalries were disrupting the work of almost all of the
country's top political bodies. This included the
23-man Collective Presidency and 8-man Party Ex-
ecutive Bureau that Tito-- determined to insure that
no one man or ethnic group would dominate the
political scene after his departure — had recently es-
tablished as the key elements in his blueprint for
succession. The Croats were behaving in a particular-
ly obstreperous fashion. For its part, the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), long relegated to a
guiding rather than a commanding role, had
degenerated into something approaching a confedera-
tion of nine virtually autonomous party organizations
(eight of them regionally-based, the ninth geared to
the military establishment). In short, Yugoslavia was
in the throes of its worst political crisis since Tito
came to power.

Tito had simply let too much authority slip away
from Belgrade. Like Franco, he had failed to establish
tried and trusted political institutions that could func-
tion effectively without his intercession — albeit his
failure on this score was attributable to too much
change and innovation rather than too little.
Moreover, he had misjudged in his belief that he could
tame maverick regional leaders by co-opting them
into the collective bodies destined to inherit his enor-
mous powers.

Tito had not, however, made the mistake of un-
derestimating the potential importance of the military
factor in Yugoslavia’s domestic equation. In fact, he
had begun to revamp the country’s traditionally aloof
military establishment and to draw it into the
mainstream of domestic politics as a unifying force
some three years before the crisis finally broke.

Although far from untouched by the centrifugal
forces affecting the society at large, the Yugoslav
military establishment (unlike the LCY) was still a
genuinely national institution in 1971. Moreover,
Yugoslavia’s military leaders were not only apprehen-
sive about what they perceived as anarchical trends
but fearful that the fact that the country’s
recently-established paramilitary defense forces had
been placed under local civilian control might presage
a potentially disastrous decentralization of the regular
armed forces as well. Thus they ' ere, for the most
part, more than ready to back any corrective action
that Tito chose to take.

Confronted with the continuing inability of central
Party and government organs to rein in the blatantly
chauvinistic leadership of Croatia, Tito’s patience
finally ran out in December 1971. With the active and
explicit support of senior military leaders, he
short-circuited the political superstructure he had
created and moved to set things straight in a manner
reminiscent of earlier times.

Although bloodless, the shake-up was Draconian
by post-war Yugoslav standards. It took nearly three
years for the dust to settle. When it did, hundreds of
functionaries throughout the country had lost their
jobs. Some ten percent of those individuals who had
been carried on LCY membership rolls in 1971 had
been expelled or otherwise “selected out.” The Party
itself had been recentralized, and its leading role had
at least in theory been restored. The nation’s
paramilitary defense forces had been placed under
firm federal control. The military had been given a
greater voice in national policy-making councils, and
active duty generals had been assigned to two key
federal internal security posts. The cumbersome
Collective Presidency had been pared from twenty-
three to nine members. And most of Tito's revised
political giound rules had been formalized in new
Party statutes and a new constitution.

On balance, Titoism has emerged the stronger for
its ordeal. Although the changes that Tito has made
since 1971 have not altered the pluralistic— or even, in
many areas, the basically decentralized — nature of his
system, they have corrected or attenuated many of the
flaws and imbalances that had threatened to
overwhelm it before he even left the scene.
Hierarchical lines of authority and responsibility have
been restored and clarified. The nation’s ideological
and ethnic extremists have at least temporarily been

12

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

routed, (ihi'ingcs in electoral procedures have narrow-
ed direct (and potentially highly chauvinistic) popular
participation in the governmental process to the local
level, And most importantly, perhaps, the LCY seems
io be at least part way along the road toward resurrec-
tion as a national and relatively disciplined in-
stitution — ‘Without sacrifice of its original (and
basically healthy) nature as a broadly-based coalition
of differing interests.

1 iu s heirs will, in fact, start off in a somewhat
stronger position than Franco’s. The legitimacy of
their positions— and of their system of rule— will be
less in doubt, the loyalty and political role of their
military colleagues less ambiguous. 1 Moreover,
renewed uneasiness over Soviet intentions may at least
temporarily evoke a spirit of unity and cooperation
that is likely to be lacking in Madrid.

Hut despite these advantages, the political oudook
for post-Tito Yugoslavia is even more uncertain than
that lor post-Franco Spain, For one thing,
Yugoslavia’s economic problems arc more serious and
more sensitive to adverse global trends and
developments. 1 " Its ethnic rivalries promise to persist,

’ Although it is difficult to judge just how successful 'Tito has been in
extending the loyalty of the military establishment beyond his person to
his system, Yugoslavia’s military leaders appear to be satisfied with the
present situation. While they have willingly assumed a more con-
spicuous guardianship role, they have so far shown little sign of in-
dependent political ambitions. Thus, unless the LCY again succumbs
to ethnic or leadership rivalries, Tito’s successors arc likely to encounter
little difficulty in subordinating Yugoslavia’s armed forces to civilian
control. A comprehensive analysis of civil-military relations in
Yugoslavia is presented in C JFK’s The Political Pole of the Tueuslnv
Military , March 1975,

"Rising world prices and the economic slowdown in the West have
magnified \ ugoslavia s chronic inflation, balance-of-paymcnts, and un-
employment problems. Partly because of rising import prices— and
partly because of the huge wage increases secured by Yugoslavia’s
politically powerful workers— the cost of living index climbed nearly 30
percent in 1974, compared to 20 percent in 1973. Shrinking export
markets, heavy dependence on high-priced Western raw materials, and
a decline in both tourism earnings and remittances from the country’s
nearly 9(X),0(K) emigrant workers combined to yield a record year-end
current account deficit of around 5700 million. At the same time, a
growing influx of workers returning home after losing their jobs abroad
(some 75.0(H) in 1974 alone) has driven the level of officially registered
unemployment to about 9 percent of the nonagricultura! workforce for
the country as a whole — and to more than double that figure in some
traditionally backward regions. If the austerity program introduced by
Belgrade in late 1974 (which is already under fire from various
Republican capitals) fails to alleviate these problems before Tito passes
from the scene, bis successors arc likely to find ii very difficult to impose
needed new sacrifices on recalcitrant regional and economic factions.

providing, inter aha , fertile ground for domestic: and
foreign intrigue. Its revamped political institutions are
still weakly rooted. And its overall governmental
system is enormously complex.

To complicate matters, Yugoslavia— like Spain —
will experience a triple succession. Tito’s role as Head
of State will be assumed by the Collective Presidency,
with the title and functions of President of the
Republic rotating annuallv among its eight
regionally-based members. (Upon Tito’s departure,
the ninth member— ex officio the President of the
LCY— will be ineligible to hold the top governmental
job.) But preponderant power will pass to the LCY
where it will be shared jointly by Tito’s successor as
Parly President (as yet to be designated but quite
possibly Stanc Dolanc who, as a Slovene, would be
acceptable to most other ethnic groups) and the
newly-renamed Executive Committee. The latter
body, recently expanded to 15 members and broad-
ened by the addition of a military representative,
is evidently intended to serve as the country’s
supreme political watchdog and arbiter. Obviously,
the successful functioning of such a system in the
absence of a clearly dominant leader will depend upon
maintenance of a much higher degree of consensus
than has been attainable in the past.

All told, therefore, the room for mischance and mis-
calculation is great. At best, a lengthy period of con-
siderable instability appears inevitable. At worst,
deepening political crisis might result in the fragmen-
tation of Yugoslavia— with the attendant risk of
renewed Easi-West confrontation. ,v However, given
the prospect that Yugoslavia's armed forces would
probably step in before domestic turmoil got com-
pletely out of hand, the latter contingency appears
relatively unlikely.

In one way or another, the Yugoslav succession will impact on
Washington’s now muted adversary relationship to Moscow. The West
has a considerable stake in Yugoslavia’s survival as a relatively cohesive
and fully independent state. For its part, the Kremlin has never recon-
ciled itself cither to the loss of its one-time client or to Tito’s seemingly
heretical domestic and foreign policies. The USSR’s response to
developments in Belgrade is likely to continue to be largely reactive
(and, for a while, at least, relatively restrained). Nonetheless, the dis-
closure or Soviet links to the recent efforts of die-hard Yugoslav Stalinists
to form a rival underground Communist party demonstrates that
Moscow has left few stones unturned in its search for ways to improve
its ability to influence what happens in Yugoslavia once Tito departs
the scene. Under most circumstances, then, the greater the difficulties
that Tito’s heirs encounter, the greater the temptation will be for the
Kremlin to meddle actively in Yugoslavia’s internal affairs— and the
greater the chance of serious strains in East-West relations.

13

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

In any event, the pressures (both internal and, quite
possibly, from Moscow) on Tito’s heirs to move
toward a more restrictive form of authoritarian rule
will undoubtedly be strong. Just how much tightening
up may actually ensue is open to question. But even if
Yugoslavia's new leaders succeed in fending off these
pressures, it will probably be some time before they
feel secure enough to risk a new round of political
liberalization. And the same defensive considerations
are likely to dictate retention of the essential features
(but not necessarily the flamboyancy) of Yugoslavia’s
current foreign policy course.

Opening Pandora's Box: °ortugal and Greece

With the collapse of the Caetano and Ioannidis
regimes — the former from an audacious nudge ad-
ministered by a handful of disgruntled junior officers
in April 1974, the lattei of its own weight some three
months later — Lisbon and Athens have set about the
difficult and potentially risky task of establishing
democratic rule. For reasons which will be elaborated
below, Portuguese prospects for success arc clearly the
poorer. But if past experience is any guide, the
chances that representative government will finally
take firm root on the rocky shores of the Aegean arc
not so good either. Ever since they won their in-
dependence from Turkey in 1829, the Greeks have
been alternating between anarchical binges and
authoritarian cures. And there is little reason to
believe that the cycle has now been broken.

Portugal

Twentieth century authoritarianism emerged in
Portugal in much the same way that it did in
Spain — except that the Portuguese were spared
Spain’s chaotic and bloody interregnum between
floundering military dictatorship arid stable civilian
rule. Not that the military leaders who put an end to
Portugal’s brief stab at democracy in 1926 proved any
more capable of coping with the problems associated
with modernizing change in a backward society than
the Spanish officers who had seized power in Madrid
some three years earlier. But Portugal’s generals
found someone who was up to this task, a strong-will-
ed professor of economics named Antonio de Oliviera
Salazar, and they more or less gratefully shifted the
burden of rule to his shoulders before disaster struck.

Salazar, who was named Prime Minister in 1932,
fashioned his country into a corporatist, single-party,
authoritarian state — a solution compatible with its
prevailing circumstances and traditions. Although
theoretically subordinate to the President of his Estado
Novo (New State), he thoroughly dominated the Por-
tuguese political scene until incapacitated by a stroke
in 1968. Like Franco, he brought his country political
stability and, initially at least, economic advance. 20
But unlike Franco, his strategy and tactics changed
little over time. As a result, his domestic institutions
and policies — and his approach to Portugal’s colonial
problems — became increasingly anachronistic.

Salazar’s successor as Prime Minister, Marcello
Gaetano, sought to rectify this situation. But he lacked
either the personal or constitutional authority to over-
come the opposition of President Americo Thomaz
(an admiral who had been Portugal’s nominal Head
of State since 1958) and other ultra-conservative
elements. Thus, far from serving their intended pur-
pose, Gaetano’s halting efforts at political and
economic reform and at introducing some flexibility
into Lisbon's colonial stance helped to surface
long-extant undercurrents of discontent within almost
all politically relevant sectors of Portuguese
society — including the military establishment.

Given what seemed to be the balance of forces in
Portugal in early 1974, Caetano ’s downfall would
have been less surprising had it been at the hands of
cither ultra-conservatives or disillusioned moderates.
That it was not, that it was in fact engineered by a few
youthful proponents of radical societal reforms, il-
lustrates how critical a role a numerically small but
determined group of officers can play within a divided
and relatively apathetic military establishment.
Within months, what apparently began in mid-1973
as an extemporaneous secret conclave focused on
irksome professional grievances had developed into a
full-fledged conspiratorial organization — the Armed
Forces Movement (AFM)— dedicated to an early
political settlement of Portugal’s colonial wars abroad
and to the establishment of “democratic” rule at
home.

•’"Salazars conservative economic policies brought Portugal un-
precedented fiscal stability but only a modest, and in the end declining,
rate of growth. It has been said that in his fear that he might run the
economy onto the rocks, he ran it onto the sands instead. Although
Caetano did what he could to gel thingi moving again, Portugal’s per
capita GNP in early 1974 (SI, 140) was mW the lowest in Western
Europe.

14

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

Relatively little is known about the internal
dynamics of the AFM — either before or after the es-
sentially bloodless coup of April 1974. At the time, the
Movement probably numbered no more than two or
three hundred officers, a tiny fraction of the tri-service
officer corps. (However, most other officers readily
accepted the overthrow of the Gaetano regime, and
apparently many of these have since been co-opted
into the AFM.) As is still the case today, the
organization’s membership spanned the political
spectrum from moderates to radical leftists — with in-
dividuals of the latter persuasion in the definite
minority. But since the radicals had been the prime
movers behind the conspiracy, they emerged from the
coup with disproportionately strong representation in
the AFM ’s original top leadership council (the
Political Coordinating Commission).

Apart Iron i the AFM’s general and vaguely defined
commitment to democracy and socio-economic
reform, there was little initial consensus on longer-
term objectives. Moreover, most of the country’s new
leaders were political neophytes. One of their first
mistakes, perhaps, was establishing a definite 12-18
month timetable for the transition process — a step
which showed little appreciation of formidable
societal obstacles to stable and effective representative
government (e.g., strong authoritarian and patronal
traditions, the sharp dichotomy between the urban
and rural sectors of the population, and the absence of
a large middle class).

In any event, the determination of the
predominantly left-wing AFM leadership to force a
hasty and indiscriminate dismantling of the old
order— and to dictate the shape of the new— augured
ill for any early and reasonably orderly passage to
democratic rule. On one hand, the radicals naive and
cavalier approach to political and societal change
sparked an unnecessarily sharp and destabilizing es-
calation of popular demands and expectations. On the
other, it made an intense and potentially lengthy
post-coup power struggle with numerically superior
moderate and conservative forces inevitable.

Over the past ten months, this struggle has passed
through a scries of distinct phases. Successive crises
have brought marked shifts in actors, alignments, and
issues. In the process, the effective balance of forces in
Lisbon has become progressively less representative of

the nation at large. The political and economic chaos
born of the sudden collapse of old institutions has
been compounded by ambiguous, inconsistent, and
constantly changing new ground rules.* 11 And the Por-
tuguese Communist Party (PGP) has been afforded
repeated opportunities to strengthen and consolidate
its position.

At first, AFM leaders sought * control things from
behind the scenes, refusing— in disregard of Por-
tugal’s hierarchical traditions — to institutionalize
their position in either the political or military pecking
order. However, the abnormality of their role, and the
pressure they brought to bear for rapid
decolonization, soon brought them into conflict with
Genera) Spinola, the highly popular but basically con-
servative critic of the old regime whom the AFM it sell
had tapped to serve as Provisional President and head
of the seven-man “Junta of National Salvation.”

The advantage seemed to lie with Spinola. His sup-
porters held sway in the Junta. The composition of the
other two top governmental bodies, the Council of
State (a partly civilian executive organ with the Junta
as its nucleus) and the coalition style cabinet (Coun-
cil of Ministers), was relatively balanced between
centrists and leftists. T he civilian Prime Minister was
in general sympathy with Spinola’s views. AnJ while
Spinola's old friend, Armed Forces Chief of Staff
Costa Gomes, chose to play the role of mediator, his
reputation as a political moderate suggested that the
President could count on his support in a crunch.

Nevertheless, Spinola overplayed his hand in
mid-July by attempting to alter the AFMs electoral
timetable to his advantage. The move was actively op-
posed not only by the AFM vn ma\st\ but by virtually

’ Sint i* ilu* roup, the Portuguese economy has been shaken by labor
militancy. popular unrest, and general uncertainty. These woes have
been compounded by the worsening economic picture in Kuropc as a
whole. As a result, industrial production, retail sales, and private invest-
ment have declined and receipts from tourism and worker's remittances
are down. Moreover, the country's al rming pre-coup inllation rate (23
percent) has edited upward, and returning soldiers and settler* Irom
Alrit a (as well as emigre laborers from Western Kurope) have swelled
the ranks of die unemployed. These difficulties have been particularly
imsrttlini* because, in their initi.il enthusiasm. Portugals' new leade-s
promised almost everything from higher wages and expanded social
security hrmfits to reduced inllation and lower unemployment. And
ever since, these men have been faced with the difficult and politically
sensitive task of choosing between their conflicting commitments.

15

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

the entire political left as well. When the dust settled,
AFM leaders held four cabinet posts (including that
of Prime Minister), command of the Lisbon Military
District, and operational control of a new military in-
ternal security force— the Continental Operations
Command (COPCON).

Among other things, the final stages of this skirmish
underscored the basic contradiction between the
AFM radicals’ professed commitment to democracy
and their more revolutionary political, social, and
economic objectives. Afterwards, the AFM’s
strengthened grip on the levers of power simply rein-
forced the radicals’ propensity to ignore any vaunted
new democratic rights and safeguards that might
benefit their adversaries. Thus, in late September,
when Spinola sought to recoup his losses by staging a
massive rally of moderates and conservatives, the
worried AFM leadership joined forces with the Com-
munists to thwart this move by extralegal means.
Deserted at the height of the crisis by Costa Gomes,
Spinola resigned two days later with a bitter speech
warning that Portugal was heading toward chaos and
“new forms of slavery.”

Spinola ’s departure marked a major watershed in
the post-coup course of Portuguese domestic affairs.
The relatively compliant Costa Gomes was promptly
elevated to the post of Provisional President; and,
following a number of other top-level personnel
changes designed to make the Junta, Council of State,
and cabinet more responsive to AFM direction, the
key arena of conflict between radicals and moderates
shifted to the AFM itself. The principal issues were
(I) the direction and pace of further reforms, and (2)
the nature and duration of the AFM’s political role.
Both generated renewed interest in institutionalizing
the still amorphous Movement. On one hand, Por-
tugal’s young military Jacobins now saw creation of a
formal elitist revolutionary organization as a prere-
quisite for expansion and perpetuation of their
political power. On the other, many moderates un-
doubtedly hoped that institutionalization would
provide them with the organizational and procedural
tools they needed to neutralize the radicals.

The institutional entity that rather swiftly emerged
bore more than a passing resemblance to classical
Communist organizational practice — albeit the
ground rules allowed for freer debate than is generally

associated with Marxist “democratic centralism.” 22
Thus, although the broadening of the AFM’s com-
mand structure and the proliferation of lower level ad-
visory bodies brought the rift between the left-
ist-dominated leadership and the predominantly
moderate rank and file into sharper relief (and
thereby fueled growing divisions within the leadership
itself), they did not significantly weaken the radicals’
position. The radicals were forced to move slowly, to
compromise, and occasionally to accept defeat. But
overall, they succeeded in gradually moving Portugal
in the direction they desired.

Indeed, the primal trend in Portuguese politics
since Spinola’s departure has been the growing subor-
dination of democracy to revolutionary change in the
official guiding ethos. As a resuit, Portuguese society
has become increasingly polarized. An open rift has
developed in the cabinet between the PCP and its
sympathizers on the one hand, and the Socialists and
center-left Popular Democrats on the other. And
political tolerance — never a prominent Portuguese
characteristic — has dwindled rapidly. 23

Incremental movement toward revolutionary
military rule gave way to a potential quantum jump in
mid-February 1975 when AFM radicals succeeded in
securing organizational approval of a scheme whereby

•"From mid-October 1 974 until mid-March 1975, a 20-man Superior
Council chaired by Costa Gomes (and including strong radical
representation) operated something like a politburo and served as the
primary olTicial channel for bringing AFM influence to bear on every
facet of the domestic sceac. The Political Coordinating Commission ex-
ercised the functions of a powerful secretariat, and a consultative
200-member General Assembly performed the role of a central com-
mittee. Moving downward, council-assembly organizations were es-
tablished at all levels of command within each of the armed services. In
addition, agitprop groups were assigned to most units— and similar
teams were dispatched to the countryside to “educate” the peasantry as
well.

•"For example, one of the Portuguese Government’s Iirst moves after
Spinola resigned was to establish a Convnission for the Extinction of
fascism headed by the distinctly radical operational boss of COPCON.
Since then, official hostility toward virtually the entire politic il right
has, with the enthusiastic cooperation of the PCP, found more and
more frequent reflection in the public media. Moreover, as
demonstrated by the repeated failure of forewarned COPCON forces to
prevent groups of leftist militants from disrupting the activities of Por-
tugal's few “non-revolutionary” (i.c.. centrist) parties, political violence
has been tolerated so long as it has been directed against potential
enemies of the AFM’s envisaged new order. On the other side of the
coin, traditional fears of the left have resurfaced and hardened. Faith in
the establishment and in its promises of genuinely representative elec-
tions has waned. And in this increasingly charged atmosphere, one
counter-coup has already been attempted.

16

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

the AFM would continue to guide the Portuguese
political processes for an indefinite period. 2 ' The of-
ficial opening date for campaigning for the scheduled
12 April constituent assembly elections was then post-
poned until mid-March in order to give AFM
“negotiating teams” time to jawbone any recalcitrant
political parties into accepting the projected new
ground rules. These developments were applauded by
the Communists, and no wonder. It was just the sort
of scenario that PCP Chairman Cunhal— faced with
the likelihood that his party would garner no more
than 10-20 percent of the vote in any freely-held elec-
tions— had been advocating all along.

The PCP has taken full advantage of political dis-
array — and of its cordial tics with some AFM
leaders — to bolster its domestic position. But it is still
far from strong enough to mount a successful
takeover on its own. Moreover, Party Chairman
Cunhal, whose grasp of Portuguese realities
(including the strength of rural conservatism) seems
to be considerably firmer than that of some AFM
militants, clearly favors a cautious and basically
evolutionary route to power — an attitude which ap-
parently enjoys Moscow’s blessing. Thus a prolonged
period of revolutionary military rule during which the
Communists could build their power and influence
with the assistance (whether calculated or uninten-
tional) of friendly AFM radicals offers the PCP the
best of all possible worlds.

For their part, however, Portugal’s four democratic
parties of the moderate left and right dug in their heels
and tried to secure significant revisions in the AFM’s
plan through hard bargaining. For a moment in early
March, it seemed that they might succeed. Indeed,
the sweeping victories scored at that juncture by
moderate officers in secret balloting for seats on two
AFM service-level advisory councils raised the
possibility that the radicals’ hold on the AFM com-
mand structure might soon be broken as well. But on

■■'III brier, this plan specified that prior AFM approval or till presiden-
tial candidates was to be mandatory. The AFM was to have the right to
name the ministers of defense and economy (and possibly the Prime
Minister) in any fiiturc constitutionally-formed government. The
country’s new constitution would have to conform to the AFM program
that was published shortly after the April 1974 coup. Continued
military control of the Council of State was to be assured, and that body
was to be granted legislative powers (presumably against the day when
the Junta of National Salvation ceased to exist). And no “conservative
changes in a newly decreed three-year economic plan were to be per-
mitted.

11 March, an abortive and incredibly inept coup
attempt involving a number of Spinola’s sympathizers
changed matters abruptly.

Whatever the true story behind it may ultimately
prove to be, the attempted coup provided the radicals
with just the boost they needed. They lost no time in
overriding the AFM’s now dazed and demoralized
moderates and in securing a virtual carte blanche.
Under the radicals’ direction, the AFM promptly
assumed full control of Portuguese political affairs.
The “February plan” was cast aside, and the next two
weeks were highlighted by the following
developments:

—The Council of State, the Junta of National
Salvation, and the AFM’s existing top council were
abolished and were replaced by a single,
radical-dominated military ruling body endowed
with broad executive and legislative powers (the
28-member Superior Council of the Revolution);

—Communists and crypto-Communists were given
greater representation in the cabinet in order to
make it more “responsive” to the AFM’s reform
program;

Portuguese banks and insurance companies were

nationalized, and prompt extension of state control
to other “basic” sectors of the economy was
promised;

— The constituent assembly elections were post-
poned until 25 April and three officially registered
parties (two ultra left groups hostile to the PCP
plus the center-right Christian Democratic Party)
were barred from participation — thus reducing the
field to six radical fringe parties (two of them sub-
ject to PCP influence), the Communist-dominated
Portuguese Democratic Movement, the PCP, the
Socialists, the center-left Popular Democrats and
Monarchists, and the center-right Social
Democratic Center Party.

It would appear that the major elements in the
radicals’ emerging blueprint for the future are no
longer open to serious negotiation. Moreover, one of
the AFM’s most prominent (and most outspoken)
radical leaders already has publicly declared that the
party that manages to get the most votes does not
necessarily represent the best interests of the people.
Under these circumstances — and given the un-
representative range of pavty choices to be offered to

17

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

the voters — constituent assembly elections (if held at
all) will be virtually meaningless. Unless things
change greatly in the interim, so will any general elec-
tions that might follow. Portugal is, in fact, well on the
way toward establishment of something akin to the
radical Velasco military regime in Peru. 25 And in the
Portuguese context, that spells continued, and quite
possibly growing instability.

By their latest actions, the AFM radicals have
placed themselves more squarely than ever on a
collision course with the centrists and conservatives
who still make up the bulk of the population and the
armed forces. Thus, despite the dampening effect of
the 1 1 March events, organized conspiratorial activity
is likely to resume before too long. Moreover, if
political and economic conditions continue to
deteriorate at their present rate, an increasing number
of politically moderate Portuguese will probably join
in.

Of course, the line of march that has now been laid
down is not irreversible. In fact, the new ground rules
specify that the recently expanded 240 man assembly
of the Armed Forces Movement may expel any
member of the Superior Council of the Revolution by
as yet undefined voting margins and procedures. But
just how meaningful this will prove to be in practice is
open to serious question. Open critics of
“revolutionary change” now risk purge or worse. For
their part, the radicals have demonstrated that they
will not be banished to the political sidelines without a
fight. And in the event of a showdown, they can
probably count on the PCP to come to their aid again
in any way it can. Thus, the chances that AFM
moderates will be able to gain political control
without staging a virtual counter-coup appear to be
relatively poor.

Moreover, even if it involved little or no bloodshed,
any successful attempt by cither moderate or conser-
vative forces to wrest predominant power away from
the radicals would more than likely result in the im-
position of another authoritarian regime — at least on
an interim basis. There would seem to be no feasible
alternative. For one thing, in an environment where
the concept of a loyal opposition enjoys so little
currency, stringent internal security measures would

- A comprehensive analysis of the Velasco regime is presented in
OPR s Peru's Stalin I Revolution: hnf dilations and Prospects , January
1975.

be required for quite some time. But more important,
perhaps, Portugal’s growing economic problems and
the divisive impact of much of what has happened
since April 1974 have created a whole series of new
and potentially intractable obstacles to stable and
effectual representative government.

In short, the real question now is not whether Por-
tugal will end up under some form of authoritarian
rule in the years just ahead, but what kind of
authoritarian rule it will be. If it turns out to be a
regime dominated by either the far left or the far right,
Portuguese participation in NATO and bilateral
military arrangements with the US will be adversely
affected. Quite apart from the other problems it would
pose for Washington, a far-leftist regime would in all
likelihood seek to weaken or break these ties. And
however much an ultra-conservative regime might
wish to preserve Portugal’s existing alliances, it would
probably prove as divisive to NATO and generate as
much popular disapproval within the US as the late
military dictatorship in Greece.

Greece

Just as Iberian traditions and circumstances have
favored the persistence of authoritarian rule in Por-
tugal, geographically induced parochialism and the
legacy of nearly 400 years of Turkish domination
have, until now at least, posed virtually insuperable
obstacles to the establishment of stable and effective
democratic government in modern Greece. The tur-
moil, hardships, and misrule suffered under the Turks
produced a people imbued with predominantly
egocentric values and veliant for their safety and
well-being on close family tics or other narrow and
highly personalistic alliances. And ever since in-
dependence was achieved, Greek hyper-individualism
and patronal traditions have found reflection in the
formation of innumerable small, personalistic, and
generally short-lived political parties, as well as in a
propensity for uninhibited political infighting.

Together with the stresses and strains stemming
from modernizing change and various untoward ex-
ternal developments, this state of affairs has resulted
in both chronic instability and experimentation with
widely differing forms of rule. In the past 65 years
alone, Greece has experienced six military coups,
three attempted coups, one royal assassination, one
civil war, and three dictatorships — not to mention
alternating monarchical and republican political

18

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

systems and countless instances of arbitrary royal in-
tervention in parliamentary affairs. The average life of
non-dictatorial Greek governments between 1910 and
the military coup of April 1967 was less than one year.
Some lasted only a few days or weeks.

There was one bright spot in this generally doleful
record. In sharp contrast to the strife ana chaos which
marked the opening years of the post-World War II
period, Greece entered into a decade of relative
political stability and growing prosperity in 1952 un-
der a series of popularly-elected conservative
governments. 26 It was a period also notable for the
coalescence of most Greek political parties into three
broad coalitions: Konstantinos Karamanlis’ conser-
vative National Radical Union (formed in 1956),
Georgios Papandreou’s moderate Center Union
(formed in 1961), and the Communist-dominated
United Democratic Left (formed in 1951, four years
after the Greek Communist Party itself was out-
lawed).

Nonetheless, electoral victories scored by the
moderates in 1963-64 and accompanying gains by the
left touched off a period of political turmoil and
polarization which ultimately spawned the military
coup of 1967. What happened during the ensuing
seven years offers scholars a wealth of material for
studies of the dynamics and potential shortcomings of
prolonged military rule in a relatively sophisticated
environment. For the purposes of this paper, however,
a summary analysis of the Papadopoulos and Ioan-
nidis regimes will suffice to relate Greek experience to
the generalizations about authoritarianism and
militarism set forth in earlier discussion and to set the
stage for an appraisal of the country’s current efforts
to restore representative government.

In view of the fact that the military coup of April
1967 was basically an institutional affair, two of the
most notable developments that followed were the
gradual emergence of Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos
as the dominant leader v/ithin the ruling junta and the
accompanying trend toward personalization and
civilianization of the regime. Indeed, Papadopoulos
unwittingly foreshadowed events which were to take

* Because of civil war and governmental instability, post-war
economic recovery did not really get underway in Greece until 1951.
Between 1952 and 1963 the country’s output of manufactured goods
doubled. Its capacity to generate electric power increased threefold.
Overall economic growt h averaged over 6 percent a year. And per
capita GNP (calculated in constant 1970 prices) rose from S360 to S670.

place in a much freer atmosphere some 18 months
later when, following royal involvement in an abortive
Navy mutiny, he staged a constitutional plebiscite in
July 1973 which made Greece a republic for the
second time in 50 years, accorded wide powers to the
new presidency, and elevated him from Prime
Minister to the office of President for a seven-year
term.

Ironically, Papadopoulos’ subsequent moves
toward restoration of civilian rule — particularly his
appointment of a civilian Prime Minister identified
with the old order, his gestures signalling possible
relaxation of pressures on the political left, and his
promise of general elections in 1974— proved to be his
undoing. On one hand, they were taken as a sign of
weakness by dissident students, workers, and intellec-
tuals (and therefore as offering a golden opportunity
to resume traditionally free-swinging protest ac-
tivities). On the other, they added a sense of
“revolution betrayed” to the brief that many conser-
vative military officer: —including the powerful
military police chief, Brigadier General Dimitrios
Ioannidis — had been building against Papadopoulos
ever since his personal ambitions had become evident.

The instability generated by these parallel
developments erupted in crisis in November 1973
when the Army had to be called in to help subdue
rioting students and workers in Athens. Considerable
bloodshed resulted, and the incident furnished loan-
nidis and his cohorts with a handy excuse to oust
Papadopoulos. 25X6A

the relative stability of his regime through 1 972 was at
least in part attributable to his success in securing and
maintaining the qualified but nonetheless effective
acceptance of the bulk of the population. For one
thing, the respite from governmental paralysis and
domestic chaos was, initially at least, welcome in
many quarters. For another, suspension of par-
ticipatory politics was less disruptive of traditional
Greek ways of getting things done than is generally
conceded. The focus of the deeply-ingrained
patronage system simply shifted away from elected
representatives to local military commanders and the
administrative bureaucracy. Moreover, Greece
benefitted from general West European prosperity

19

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

2 5X6 A

2 5X6 A

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

throughout Papadopoulos’ tenure, r id the steady rise
in living standards engendered by continued rapid
economic growth, liberal consumer credit, and
various measures aimed at improving the lot of the
rural population did much to take the sting out of vex-
ing political restrictions. 2 '

ulation, deprived his regime of qualified political and
administrative talent, weakened the already shaky in-
stitutions of the post- 1967 political order, forfeited
what remained of the aura of legitimacy that the 1967
conspirators had managed to impart to their rule, and
aggravated factional divisions within the armed
forces. Moreover, Ioannidis was equally inept in his
dealings with other nations. Indeed, his adventuristic
and highly nationalistic foreign policy course had
begun to pose serious problems for the US well before
it culminated in the internationally ominous — and for
Ioannidis, personally calamitous — Cyprus crisis of
July 1974.

Ioannidis’ gamble in sponsoring the National
Guard coup which deposed Cypriot President
Archbishop Makarios and elevated Nikos Samp-
son — an ardently pro -enosis 'union of Greece and
Cyprus) and anti-Turk rightwinger — to power on 15
July backfired badly. Ankara responded by sending a
large military force to Cyprus to protect both the
Turkish Cypriot minority and its own interests, a
move that threatenee »var with Greece itself. Stunned
by this turn of events, Greece’s top military com-
manders first ousted Ioannidis ard then exercised
their time-honored option of politic withdrawal.
They consulted with a variety of former politicians
and, in hopes of forming a civilian government of such
stature that it would be in a position to secure a
favorable negotiated settlement of the crisis, offered

•’The Greek economy prospered during the first five years of the
Papadopoulos era. Real growth averaged 8.6 percent annually— ex-
ceeding the commendable record achieved during the 1962-1966 period
by more than a full percentage point and outdistancing the growth of all
other West European countries. Domestic prices remained relatively
stable. Per capita GNP passed the SI, 000 mark in 1970 and reached
Si. 400 in 1972. The economy began to overheat toward the end of that
year, however, and while rapid growth continued in 1973, skyrocketing
prices resulted in a serious trade deficit and a fateful upsurge of popular
discontent.

the post of Prime Minister to the seasoned and conser-
vative Karamanlis.

Before accepting, Karamanlis — who had been liv-
ing in self-imposed exile in Paris since
1964 — demanded and received the promise of a free
hand. Sworn in as Prime Minister on 24 July, he
formed a so-called “government of national unity"
(actually a two-party, center-right coalition of old-line
politicians and liberal technocrats) and set about con-
solidating his position vis-a-vis the understandably
nervous and still predominantly anti-democratic
military establishment. His strategy included prompt
restoration of the country's 1952 constitution (except
for those portions pertaining to monarchy), discreet
military transfers and retirements, and, most impor-
tantly, preparations for early elections.

His need to keep the military at bay and to
strengthen Athcn's international position were not.
how^.^., ICiramanlis’ only reasons for seeking a
prompt popular mandate. U. disenchantment with
Greece’s pre-coup political order was no less profound
than that of the military officers who toppled it in
1967, and he had spent his years in Paris devising
plans for what he believed would b^ a more effective
and stable form of representative rule. To implement
these plans, he needed a firm Parliamentary majority.
Hence he had to move before unavoidable domestic or
international difficulties eroded his newly-reborn pop-
ularity

The results of the 17 November 1974 elections
fulfilled Karamanlis’ fondest hopes. His New
Democracy Party (essentially a reincarnation of his
old National Radical Union) garnered about 55 per-
cent of the vote and, thanks to the intricacies of the
country’s freshly revised electoral law’, 220 out of 300
parliamentary seats. Moreover, in according Georgios
Mavros’ moderate Center Union-New’ Forces another
20 percent of their votes (and 60 parliamentary scats),
the Greek electorate had firmly rejected the extremes
of both left and right. 2 " (Just three weeks later, Gnek
voters satisfied another major — albeit unspoken —

Karamanlis’ actions in legalizing Greece's two rival Communist
parties and announcing the country's withdrawal from NATOs in-
tegrated military command had stolen much of the left’s old thunder.
Hie Communist -affiliated United I>eft won only 9 percent of the vote
and K parliamentary scats. A radical left break-nway group from the
original Center Union received 13 percent of the vote and 12 seats. For
its part, the ultra-conservative National Democratic Union ended up
with 2 percent of the vote and no seats at all.

20

Approved For Release 2001/08/21cp®fW^IDPi86T00608R000600170029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

Karamanlis goal by opting for republican rule by
better than a 2 to 1 majority.)

Karamanlis waited to unveil his blueprint for the
future until the new Parliament had met and elected a
provisional Greek President. Then, on 23 December,
he presented a draft constitution based on a strong
Gaullist-style presidency for public and Parliamen-
tary debate. In its defense, he argued that “Greek
»ealities” made a powerful executive essential. But
given the marked resemblance between the political
system that Karamanlis proposed and General
Papadopoulos’ abortive plan for perpetuating himself
in power, it is hardly surprising that left-leaning op-
positionists promptly characterized the draft charter
as “totalitarian under a parliamentary mantle.’”’’

Karamanlis is, however, in a good position to get
his way — either through parliamentary approval or
national referendum. Moreover, if he does, his subse-
quent election as President is virtually assured. In that
event, he will take office with solidly democratic
credentials, and Greece’s period of political transition
will have been completed in remarkably short com-
pass. But the prospects for Greek democracy will not
be much better than in the past.

For one thing, demoralized right-w'ing military of-
ficers have already attempted to oust Karamanlis
once, and they arc likely to try again. For another,
Greece’s principal political coalitions are still loose
and personalistic affairs. Unless this situation
changes, the death, disability, or precipitous retire-
ment of Karamanlis (now 68 years old) could weil
result in enough instability and uncertainty to bring
even a thoroughly purged Greek Arr ; out of the
barracks once more.

Equally important, Karamanlis’ political system
does, as his critics contend, contain the seeds of
authoritarianism. In fact, he clearly intends to use the

'"Under Karamanlis' draft charter, Greece's President would he
elected by a two-thirds majority of Parliament for a five-year term. His

tensive powers would resemble those held by the King under the 1952
Constitution. He would have the authority to appoint and dismiss the
Prime Minister as well as to appoint and dismiss other cabinet
memfwrs at the Prime Minister’s request. He could also dismiss the en-
tire government and dissolve Parliament after “consulting" the Council
of the Republic (a body composed of past Presidents and Prime
Ministers). Under certain circumstances, he could convene the cabinet
under his chairmanship or suspend articles of the Constitution. He
would also have the right *o veto draft laws f which would then have to
l>e approved by a three-fifths majority of Parliament) and to proclaim
referenda on crucial national issues.

autocratic powers that he has written into his draft
constitution whenever he feels that considerations of
political efficiency or domestic order so require. And
given Greek passions and circumstances, that could
be quite often

With their ability to influence policy by parliamen-
tary means so obviously limited, radical elements of
both the left and right would be likely to take advan-
tage of periods of political permissiveness to pressure
the regime through disruptive direct action.
Moreover, there are any number of issues — including
serious economic problems, Greece’s double-barreled
rivalry with Turkey over Cyprus and Aegean
resources, and the whole fabric of Greek relations with
NATO and Washington — which could generate
enough domestic turmoil to justify recourse to ex-
traordinary executive powers. 10 In theory, these
deviations from democratic norms would be tem-
porary. But history suggests that “emergency”
powers are seldom fully relinquished, particularly in
countries where the parliamentary and judicial checks
on the executive arc weak. Thus, authoritarian rule
could just as easily return to G r eece in increments as
via another coup.

In sum, if Greece’s projected Presidential
government is established under Karamanlis'
leadership and ground rules, it will be better equipped
to cope with the nation's problems and idiosyncracies
than any of its post-war civilian predecessors. But
given Greek circumstances and the severity of the
destabilizing pressures that the Athens regime is likely
to encounter once Karamanlis’ current honevmoon
with the gcreral populace begins to wane, there will
still be at least an even chance that Greece will be
back urdcr *omc form of authoritarian rule within the
next 5 to 10 years. The domestic and international im-
plications of such a development would, of course,

“ Hie austerity program inaugurated by Ioannidis shortly after he
seized power was showing results by mid-1974. Karamanlis thus in-
herited an economy marked by an industrial slowdown, a declining but
not insignificant inflation rate (12 percent), and an improving though
still serious balance of payments situation. Since then, the lingering
effec ts of the Cyprus crisis, the impact of sharply higher outlays for oil
imports, and the continued deterioration of the economic scene in
Luropc as a whole have deef>enrd the Greek recession. These problems
will continue to affec t the Greek economy in the year ahead, and »he
knottiest problem faring Athens will be how to stimulate economic
recovery without jeopardizing the gains previously made on the infla-
tion and trade frorts

21

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

depend upon what constellation of forces held
predominant power.

Democratic Institutions in Jeopardy: Italy and
Turkey

As direct heirs of two great rival spiritual and tem-
poral empires, Italy and Turkey could hardly be more
different culturally. Moreover, the contrast is just ' >
sharp in the economic field. With a per capita GNP of
over $2,500 (i.e., nearly as high as that of Great
Britain), Italy has passed well beyond the mid-stage
of industrial development. In fact, were it not for the
vast economic disparity between the northern and
southern parts of the country, Italy could properly be
classified as an industrially advanced state. Turkey,
on the other hand, is still primarily an agrarian
nation, and its per capita GNP of about $600 ranks it
with Albania at the bottom of the Southern Europe
scale. Vet in one respect, Italy and Turkey are similar.
In both, weakly-rooted democratic institutions are
currently being tested by the combined weight of in-
congruous traditions and pressures associated with
modernizing change. And in both, the effective sur-
vival of these institutions is open to serious question.

Italy

In assessing the prospects for Italian democracy,
optimists are wont to stress the proven ability of the
country’s post-war political system to weather
recurrent political and economic crises; the increased
capacity to respond to changing domestic imperatives
that the system has derived from the dramatic
economic boom of 1965-1971; and the gradual trans-
formation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) into
something approaching a party of the democratic left.
On the other hand, even the most sanguine observers
would probably agree that parliamentary rule has not
yet sunk firm roots in Italian soil. Moreover, the old
formulas which brought Italy political continuity, if
not stability, for the past quarter century show signs
of breaking down. And, thanks in part to dislocations
occasioned by modernizing change and world-wide
economic strains, the problems now facing Italian
political leaders are more numerous and more com-
plex than ever before.

Italy has had the shortest experience with unified
and fully representative government of the four major

powers of Western Europe. 51 Hence it is scarcely sur-
prising that the nation’s historical and cultural
heritage still creates some formidable obstacles to
stable and effective parliamentary rule. This heritage
includes a distrust of government, strong familial and
patronal traditions, and a distinctly casual attitude
toward legal and administrative regulations. It also
includes deep-seated and cross-cutting cleavages over
such issues as class and regional economic inequities
and church-state relations.

These divisive factors and forces have found reflec-
tion in ( 1 ) the number (an average of eight) and diver-
sity of nationally-based political parties that have vied
for the support of the Italian electorate since 19-18 and
(2) the pronounced factionalism within these parties
which has prevented most of them from maintaining
either strong leadership or a coherent policy line. No
post-war Italian party has ever received a majority of
the votes cast in a general election, and only once did
one come close enough to that mark to win a majority
of seats in even one chamber of the country’s
bicameral legislature (the Christian Democrats in
1948).

Coalition government (formal or tacit) has thus
been a necessity. But Italy’s disparate and divided
parties have been unable to work together for very
long — even when their goals are similar. Hence,
despite the relative consistency of overall Italian
voting patterns since the war (40-45 percent for par-
ties of the left, about the same for parties of the center,
and 10-15 percent for parties of the right), the country
has established a record for rapid cabinet turnovers
surpassed in all of post-war Western Europe only by
that of the ill-fated Fourth French Republic. The
present Moro government is the 37th since the fall of
Fascism in July 1943, and the 30th since the
proclamation of the Republic in June 1946.

'’Modern Italy was born as a constitutional monarchy (com plete
with a parliament and a cabinet ministry responsible to the parliament)
in 1870. But, with the exception of a brief and chaotic period between
the end of World War i and Mussolini’s seizure of power in 1922,
relatively few Italians could vote until after World War II. Moreover,
while the Italian electorate was allowed to decide the fate of the
monarchy and to choose a broadly representative constituent assembly
in t ( M6, Italy’s present republican constitution (which combines some
local innovations with elements drawn from both French and British
political practice) was promulgated two years later without benefit of
popular referendum. Partly because of this, and partly because of cor. •
tinuing disparities between some of its provisions and actual political
practice, the Italian vJonstitution is not as widely revered as might be in-
ferred from public rhetoric.

22

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

In the absence of strong and united governments
endowed with both a clear program of action and the
security of tenure necessary to realize it, struggles
between parties and factions and endless debates on
coalition formulae have become substitutes for effec-
tive legislative action. 32 Not that Italy’s fundamental
social and economic problems have been totally ig-
nored, but most of the constructive reforms that have
managed to get through Parliament have been much
weakened in the process. And their effectiveness has
been further impaired by a grossly inefficient ad-
ministrative bureaucracy in which sponsorship still
outweighs merit as a criterion for recruitment and
promotion.

I he popular frustrations generated by government
paralysis have led to more frequent recourse to direct
political action. Over the past decade, there has been
an upward trend in protest demonstrations, trade un-
ion agitation, and, more ominously, acts of political
violence. At the same time, the corrupting influence of
Italy’s vast subterranean political and administrative
patronage network (popularly known as the soltogover-
ho) has grown more pervasive.

Predictably, these praetorian tendencies
have together with an accompanying increase in
general lawlessness— swelled the ranks of those favor-
ing a basically authoritarian solution to their
country’s ills. Although it still commands less than 10
percent of the vote in most parts of the country, the
neo -Fas cist Mowmenlo Sociale Itahano (MSI) has scored

Beginning with Prime Minister Dc Gaspcri’s espousal of the “re-
formist center” slogan in the late 1940’s. Italian politicians have vainly
sought some sort of magic formula for constructing stable and effective
coalition governments. Although it was to be revived briefly ten years
later, the perennially dominant Christian Democrats’ original centrist
solution had been pretty well discredited by 1963. At the instigation of
Aldo Muro and Amintcrc Fanfani, it was then replaced by a
‘center-left’ formula which established Italy’s third-ranked but fac-
tion-ridden Socialist Party as the Christian Democrats’ principal coali-
tion partner. Now, in part because of electoral gains scored by both the
far left and the far right, and in part because of continued governmental
instability, this formula too has come under serious challenge. On one
hand, pressures are mounting for the adoption of a new formula that
would increase leftist influence (i.e., cither the Socialist-sponsored
“privileged axis” which would make the Socialists and Christian
Democrats <„-*/»«/ senior partners in an otherwise conventional
center-left coalition, or the “historic compromise” touted by the
Communists— a still vaguely defined proposal for a working
alliance with both the Christian Democrats and the Socialists which
would bring the PCI, Italy’s second largest party, into the national
government for the first time since 1947). On the other hand, some
of the more ardent opponents of a further opening to the left have
suggested systemic changc-in the form of establishing a strong
Gaullist-type presidency— as a preferable solution.

substantial gains over the past four years in both local
and nation-wide elections. The MSI now holds 51
parliamentary seats (i.e., nearly as many as the
Socialists), and its growing strength at the polls was
probably one of the factors that recently prompted
Christian Democratic Party Secretary Fanfani to shift
his ground and to make an open bid for the support of
the dissatisfied right with strong talk on the need for
law and order.

At the other end of the political spectrum, the PCI
has registered ? slight gain in every national election
held since the war. Although excluded from par-
ticipation in the national government since 1947, it
polled 27.2 percent of the vote in the 1972 parliamen-
tary elections and now holds 179 of 630 parliamentary
seats (i.e., two-thirds the number held by the
Christian Democrats and about as many as held by all
other parties combined). Moreover, the PCI presently
administers — in most cases in collaboration with the
Socialists— 3 of 20 regions, a dozen (out of 94) prov-
inces, and about 20 percent of all municipal coun-
cils. And its behind-the-scenes influence is growing in
a number of areas still dominated by the Christian
Democrats.

Equally significant, the Christian Democratic Party
is itself clearly losing ground— partly because of a
natural tendency to blame the principal governing
party for the country’s current economic problems^
and partly because of its continued inability to
provide an effective administration. 34 Moreover.

" Hie political prospects of the MSI arc limited, however, by the fact
thiil the fitter's Fascist character effectively precludes it from becoming

the focal point of a broad groundswcll of conservative discontent or

even from formal participation in a governing coalition. Indeed, its very
existence runs counter to both the spirit and the letter or the Italian
Constitution. And its claim to respectability has been further under-
mined by the fact that most acts of political terrorism in Italy in recent
>cnrs have been carried out by right-wing extremists.

“Italy is currently experiencing its most serious economic and lino
rial crisis ol the post-war era. By late 1974, economic recession had been
added to year-long problems with rampant inflation and oil-aggravated
balancc-of-payment woes. Thus, when Prime Minister Moro took of-
fice, lie was faced with:

A sharp slump in industrial production.

—Rising unemployment.

— i he worst inflation rate in recent Itaiian history (28 percent).
-A current account deficit of nearly S8 billion-coupled with peri-
lously low foreign exchange reserves and a poor international
credit rating.

Trade union demands (since largely satisfied) for inflationary in-
creases in cost-of-living allowances, pensions, and other fringe
benefits. 3

k3

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

Christian Democratic unity (always a tenuous affair
considering the fact that the party’s factional
groupings have traditionally spanned the spectrum
from the near-Mar.dst left to the extreme right) has
been severely strained by the rebuff the party suffered
in the divorce referendum of May 1974 and by the
steady electoral gains scoi ed by both the Communists
and neo- Fascists.

All told, the growing polarization of the Italian
political scene at the expense of the nebulous center
threatens to upset the complex balance of conflicting
interests and ideologies that has enabled the country
to weather so many seemingly mortal crises over the
past 30 years. Granted, it is possible that the PCI may
suffer as the result of popular reaction to recent
developments in Portugal. But unless the regional
elections scheduled for June 1975 reveal a reversal of
present Italian political trends, the chances are that
the Christian Democrats will fairly soon be unable to
forge a viable governmental coalition without
reaching a modus vivendi with the Communists. 35 And
should the formal entry of the PCI into the Italian
Government be hastened by political or economic
crisis, it could have profoundly destabilizing effects.

For one thing, such a development could provoke
serious domestic disorders — and possibly a coup
attempt. v ‘ For another, it could split the Christian
Democratic Party down the middle. And if that were
to happen, the chances of forming a stable and effec-
tive coalition government within the framework of
Italy’s existing political system would be slimmer
than ever. Indeed, in the absence of both a
broad-based centrist party and a clear popular man-
date for either the right or the left, Italy might rather
quickly end up with some form of authoritarian rule.

However, in the more likely event of a gradual ac-
commodation with the PCI, there is a good chance

' The alternative of trying to breathe new life into the center-left for-
mula by giving a larger slice of the political cake to the Socialists would
solve few of the problems that have contributed to the instability of
center-left coalitions in the past, and thus would seem to hold little
prospect of enduring success.

v ‘ Ami-Communist sentiment is strong in the upper echelons of the
Italian military establishment. Thus, in the event of precipitous PCI
entry into the government, a coup attempt led or backed by senior of-
ficers would be a distinct possibility. But since, under most circum-
stances, there would be a good chance that neither the Carabinieri
(paramilitary police) nor the bulk of the armed forces’ middle and
lower ranks would support such an effort, the likelihood of failure would
be high.

that pragmatic considerations of political advantage
might prompt most members of the Christian Demo-
cratic right wing to bite the bullet and remain in place.
In that case, the Christian Democratic Party would be
likely to emerge as the senior partner in the eventual
new governing coalition, and the destabilizing impact
of formal Communist participation in the government
would be less pronounced. 37 Nevertheless, the dangers
of rightist plots and disorders would persist.
Moreover, despite the overwhelming parliamentary
majority it would enjoy, the ideologically multi-hued
new coalition would probably be rather fragile for
quite some time. And since many Italians would view
it as a sort of ’ st resort solution, any signs of poor per-
formance would probably result in mounting
pressures for systemic change on both the left and the
right. Indeed, unless Christian Democratic-PGl
collaboration produced encouraging results — par-
ticularly in the economic field — the longer term
prospects for Italian parliamentary democracy would
still be guarded.

Turkey

In Turkey, just as in Italy, representative govern-
ment is basically a post-war innovation. To the
delight of Western observers, it seemed to evolve
naturally out of a highly progressive and increasingly
liberal authoritarian system of rule. In fact, however,
it was just another “Westernizing” import es-
poused — for differing reasons and with various
degrees of enthusiasm— by most members of the
modernizing elite that had dominated the Turkish
political scene since 1923. And while multi-party
democracy was rather quickly embraced by Turkey’s
politically untutored and theretofore politically
emasculated masses, the record since suggests that the
transition was premature.

When Mustafa Kcmal (Ataturk) seized power and
proclaimed the Turkish Republic in 1923, his
countrymen were unaccustomed to anything but

‘ (liven the unique characteristics of the PCI and its doctrinal dedica-
tion to a pluralistic political system, there is considerable controversy
over just how serious the implications of Communist entry into the
Italian Government would be for US strategic and economic interests.
Although this issue falls outside the purview of this study, it is addressed
at some length in NIE 24-1-74, hospects for and Consequences of Increased
Communist Influence in Italian Politics , 18 July 1974, and OPR’u
forthcoming The Communist Party of Italy: An Analysis and Some
Pred ic lions.

24

Approved For Release 2001/08Sf2f1F|DeHAURDP86T00608R000600170029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

autocratic rule.’" Moreover, the sweeping social,
political, and economic reforms that he had in mind
clearly required strong, centralized government.
Kcmal reconciled these authoritarian imperatives
with his commitment to parliamentary rule by es-
tablishing a one-party system. Backed by his enor-
mous personal prestige this arrangement worked fair-
ly smoothly until his death in 1938 (and for a few
years thereafter). But Kcmal ’s successor as Turkey’s
President and leader of the Republican People’s Party
(RPP), Ismet Inonu, was more liberally inclined, and
in 1945 he authorized the formation of opposition par-
ties. Five years later, one of these— Adnan Mendercs’
Democrat Party won a massive electoral victory over
the RPP and thereupon formed Turkey’s first
genuinely representative government.

Phis bold new experiment began to break down
before it was fairly underway. Belying its name, the
victorious Democrat Party rather promptly moved to
mute its critics— first through a series of legislated
restrictions on civil and political rights and then by
extralegal means as well. Political recriminations and
violence increased apace, culminating in the military
“revolution” of May 1960 (the first instance of direct
military intervention in Turkish political affairs in
over three decades).

The 18 months of avowedly caretaker military rule
that followed effectively returned Turkish democracy
to square one. The discredited Democrat Party was
banned. Menderes and two of his principal associates
were hanged. A more liberal constitution (interesting-
ly enough, patterned in good part on the Italian Con-
stitution of 1947) was adopted by popular referen-
dum. New elections were held, and in October 1961,
civilian government was restored— albeit under the
watchful eye of the military establishment.

But starting over in this way did not help very
much. However distruptive in its own right, the
high-handed behavior of Democrat Party leaders dur-
ing the 1950’s had only been sympathetic of the root
causes for the rapid decline of multi-party democracy.

I he I urks got a brief exposure to Western democratic practices in
1870 when a group of senior military, political, and religious officials
persuaded Sultan Abdul Hamid II (later known as Abdul Hamid the
Damned) to accept a constitution providing for a representative
parliament. Hamid dumped this experiment less than two years later
and ruled as a despot until reformist Army elements forced him to
resurrect the constitution and swear fealty to the Turkish Parliament in
1908. What emerged, however, was not crowned parliamentary
democracy but de facto military dictatorship.

kor their part, illiberal constitutional “flaws” had
been no more than a secondary contributing factor.
I he real trouble lay in large part with two interrelated
and relatively intractable phenomena: the socially
fragmenting impact of forced-draft modernization and
the persistence of strong authoritarian traditions.
And, ironically, both of these were reinforced by the
military’s “Salvationist” intervention.

1 he forces at work on the Turkish political scene
are complex and changing. In the late 1940’s,
democratization surfaced the deep cleavages that
separated the Ataturkist modernizing elite (with its
emphasis on secularization and state control of
economic affairs) from the traditionalist peasantry, on
the one hand, and from the rising entrepreneurial
class on the other. Since then, the task of achieving the
degree of consensus needed for stable and effective
democratic government has been further complicated
by new demands generated by a burgeoning urban
proletariat, the growth of extremist ideologies of both
the left and the right, and a corresponding increase in
fragmentation of the political and intellectual elite.
The harsh treatment meted out to Democrat Party
leaders added another contentious issue to this brew.
At the same time, however, the liberalized political
ground rules adopted at military insistence made
Turkey’s democratic institutions more vulnerable
than ever to the divisive currents affecting the general
populace.

The 1961 constitution established an elaborate
system of checks and balances designed to foreclose
any recurrence of the governmental excesses of the
1950 s. Together with an accompanying proportional
representation electoral law, it created a permissive
political climate that resulted in: (1) the potentially
unsettling emergence of a direct and widely popular
successor to the outlawed Democrat Party (Suleyman
Demircl s Justice Party); (2) a proliferation of splinter
parties; (3) governmental immobilism; and (4) grow-
ing instability highlighted by intra-party factional dis-
putes, student unrest, labor strife, and, by th- end of
the decade, urban terrorism.

No party won more than 37 percent of the vote in
the 1961 elections, and for the next four years, Turkey
was governed by a series of weak coalition cabinets
(all but one of which were headed by the RPP’s aping
Ismet Inonu). In 1963, the Justice Party won (and in
1969, it retained) majority control of the government.
But the temporary demise of coalition politics did not

25

Approved For Release 2001^a02rbEM$iA-RDP86T00608R000600170029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

result in significantly stronger or more dynamic
leadership. Much of DemirePs energy during his first
four years in office was devoted to domestic
fence-mending and to dealing with the ever-explosivc
Cyprus issue. Thereafter, he had to contend with a
growing rift between Justice Party moderates and
conservatives which soon culminated in a purge of the
latter and their formation of a party of their own.

In any event, the military became increasingly im-
patient with DemirePs unwillingness or inability to ex-
ert his leadership to maintain law and order or to
secure the passage of the new social reforms it desired.
Finally, in March 1971, the commanders of Turkey’s
armed forces jointly forced DemirePs resignation with
a memorandum in which they threatened to take
direct control of the country unless a new “above par-
ty” government was formed wh***h would impose
stringent internal security measures and enact
“Ataturkist reforms.” Thus ended Ankara’s second
stab at representative democracy.

For the next two and a half years, Turkey operated
under indirect military rule. Four successive nonpar-
tisan civilian governments strove to comply with the
requirements set forth in the 1971 coup memoran-
dum. Their principal achievement was restoration of
public order — a process which required maintenance
of martial law in some Turkish provinces throughout
most of the period in question. But despite the lack of
equivalent progress on the reform front, the military
establishment soon became tired of— and increasingly
divided by — its demanding political role. In April
1973, it passively accepted the Turkish Parliament’s
rejection of its preferred candidate for President. And
six months later, it took advantage of con-
stitutionally-scheduled general elections to withdraw
to the political sidelines and permit restoration of
representative government.

The game resumed amid more confusion than ever.
Reflecting the trend toward factional infighting,
splits, and defections that had marked the past four
years, three of the eight parties that competed in the
October 1973 elections were new arrivals on the
political scene. Moreover, ihc two principal con-
tenders, the RPP and the Justice Party, had both un-
dergone a considerable change in orientation and
appeal since the 1969 elections. Under the leadership
of Bulent Ecevit, the reformist and once urban and
elitist RPP had moved steadily leftward, and in 1973
it seemingly shucked off its historic reliance on the

nation’s military, bureaucratic, and academic elites
with a populistic campaign aimed at wooing the
peasant and slumdweller vote. For its part, the ini-
tially conservative Justice Parly had taken on an in-
creasingly moderate image since 1969 — a shift which
won the approval of a number of reformist elements,
but which cost the party much of its original support
from peasants, rural landholders, and the rising com-
mercial class.

The result was a stand-off. Ecevit ’s RPP won a
plurality with only 33 percent of the vote. ’Die Justice
Party, suffering from inroads made by two new
right-wing parties, was close behind with 29 percent.
For more than three months, neither major party was
able to form a viable coalition or minority
government. Finally, in early 1974, Ecevit succeeded
in forging an unlikely partnership between his secular,
left-leaning organization and the Islam-oriented new
National Salvation Party that gave him a very slim
parliamentary majority. Bui this marriage of con-
venience was doomed from the start. Punctuated by
recurrent squabbles, it lasted just long enough to see
the country through the critical initial phases of the
current Cyprus crisis.

In mid-September 1974, Ecevit sought to exploit
popular approval of his handling of the Cyprus
situation to his own and RPP advantage by resigning
his post as Prime Minister and advocating new elec-
tions. Far from swiftly achieving the results he
desired, however, his actions provoked the longest
political crisis in the brief history of Turkish
parliamentary democracy. In the absence of a ma-
jority consensus in Parliament in favor of early elec-
tions, the persistent reluctance of Turkey’s disparate
political parties to work together simply ushered in a
new period of indecisive caretaker government. By
mid-March 1973, six months of governmental
paralysis had triggered a resurgence of protest ac-
tivities and political violence. And signs of military
rcstivcncss were mounting accordingly.

Indeed, there is more than an outside chance that
the Turkish military establishment will not wait to see
how things work out on their own. Not that Turkey's
senior military commander? seem to be particularly
anxious to become embroiled in politics so soon again.
But they must reckon with the views of their impatient
younger colleagues. And while the opinions of in-
dividual officers on appropriate courses of action vary

26

Approved For Release 2001/08/f J P^ F W-RtiP86T00608R000600170029-8

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

widely, there is general agreement on one point:
Turkey’s current constellation of
problems — including the ongoing confrontation with
Greece and mounting economic ills — makes strong
and effective central government more necessary than
ever . v>

If the 1 urkish military establishment docs intervene
again, the sooner it moves the more likely that its ob-
jectives will be limited to forcing new elections. But if
Turkey’s governmental crisis drags on— or if it
culminates in the formation of an obviously ineffective
cabinet — the Turkish armed forces will probably
become increasingly inclined to opt for another in-
terlude of indirect or direct military rule. And if they
do, the interruption in Ankara’s experiment with
representative government might not be quite so brief
as in the past.' 10

Even in 1960 there were elements in the military es-
tablishment that strongly favored retaining pov/er,
and nothing that has happened since is likely to have
increased the level of confidence within the Turkish
armed forces in unfettered parliamentary democracy.
More important, perhaps, there has been a change in
both the internal and external climate. First of all,
partly because of the increasing currency of reformist
military rule, and partly because of the changing

''Turkey is in the midst of a 15-year development program (1963*77)
aimed at modernizing and industrializing its traditional,
agriculture-based economy. Despite its political troubles and recurrent
bouts with balancc-of-paymcnts difficulties and inflation, the country
maintained an average economic growth rate of better than 7 percent
until mid- 1 974. Since then, its economic prospects have been clouded
by rising oil prices (which, together with sharp wage hikes, food short-
ages, and increases in the cost of non-petroleum imports, have pushed
the annual inflation rate to nearly 35 percent) and the impact of the
general economic downturn in Europe. By the close of 1974, Turkey
had amassed a record trade deficit (82 billion). Worker remittances
were declining and returning emigrant workers were aggravating a
perennially serious unemployment problem. Moi cover, the costly
Cyprus operation had thrown the budget out of whack. And the cut-off
of US military aid in early 1975 promised further difficulties.

"’Given the absence of strong leftist influence in Turkey, the thrust of
a protracted new military sally into the political arena would be un-
likely to depart markedly from that of the 1960 and 1971 interventions.
Hence, its domestic and international ramifications would probably be
in many ways the same. At the same time, however, a return to
authoritarian rule in Ankara would probably not result in a sharp rever-
sal of the current cooling trend in US-Turkish relations. Some improve-
ment could be expected, but in today’s environment, nationalistic senti-
ment in I urkey is likely to continue to run high. 'Thus, just how signifi-
cant and durable this improvement might prove to be would probably
depend heavily on the ultimate resolution of Turkey’s twin disputes
with Greece and Ankara’s perception of US efforts towards this end.

nature of Turkey's relationships with Washington and
Western Europe, the military might feel under less
pressure to withdraw than in the past. Moreover, the
RPP is no longer the reliable civilian ally that it was
under Inonu. And worse still from the standpoint of
Turkey’s self-appointed guardians of the revolutions
of 1923 and I960, the political fragmentation of
Turkish society has now reached a level which
threatens to frustrate all constitutionally-based efforts
to reestablish a national sense of direction.

In any event, whether or not Turkey weathers its
current problems without falling back on an
authoritarian solution, the outlook for Turkish
democracy in the decade ahead is poor. Not only docs
the country still lack many of the societal attributes
required for stable and effective democratic rule, but it
is just now entering a critical midstage of development
in which the stresses and strains on its political in-
stitutions are likely to be particularly severe.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The foregoing country sketches underscore the fact
that to be stable and effective, any non-totalitarian
regime — whether authoritarian or democratic — must
be in basic consonance with prevailing customs and
circumstances. A nation’s political culture cannot be
changed by fiat; although far from immutable, its
evolution is a function of overall societal development.
Unfortunately, this relationship is still imperfectly un-
derstood. In particular, further research is needed to
collate and clarify the prerequisites for — and har-
bingers of — systemic change.

In any event, a fragmented society endowed with
strong authoritarian traditions and subject to the
destabilizing pressures of modernization provides
marginal soil for representative democracy. For one
thing, established clientage relationships and the lack
of national consensus on basic issues or experience in
the art of practical compromise arj quite likely to
result in the emergence of a large number of per-
sonalistic, ill-disciplined, and highly combative
political parties once the restraints of
authoritarianism are removed. And if, under these cir-
cumstances, the game is played under fully
democratic rules, the chances for recurrent
governmental instability — and for reversion to
authoritarianism— will be high.

27

Approved For Release 2001 /0$2^R5NPttDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

Approved For Release 2001 /OS/^^^-RDPSeTOOeOSROOOeOOl 70029-8

Moreover, most nations in the world today have a
natural propensity toward authoritarian rule — both
because it is easier to establish and maintain than
cither democracy or totalitarianism and because it is
more familiar (i.c., more closely akin to the various
kinds of traditional autocracies and oligarchies that
they have experienced in the past). At the same time,
however, the mounting problems and tensions which
promise to perpetuate— and perhaps to spread— both
authoritarianism and militarism in the decade ahead
will also make any form of rule more difficult.

Some authoritarian governments, botli civilian and
military, will prove equal to the tasks they will face.
But many more will not, and in most cases their
demise will not result in the establishment of c signif-
icantly different or more effective regime. Predict-
able increases in pressures on the West for greater
assistance and concessions to developing nations arc
thus likely to be accompanied by greater instability in
various countries around the world and a related rise
in abrasive nationalistic sentiment.

Popular demands and expectations tend to outpace
governmental capabilities by the greatest margin in
nations which are at or near a middle stage of social
and economic development. Hence, the countries of
Southern Europe will probably be subject to a par-
ticularly broad range of destabilizing pressures for

some time to come. In fact, world-wide economic
strains arc likely to make it increasingly difficult for
them to develop or maintain the necessary conditions
for enduring democratic rule. But given the complex-
ity of their circumstances, relatively stable and effec-
tive authoritarian alternatives will also prove to be
elusive.

I hus, the outlook for Southern Europe as a whole
over the next ten years is for considerable turbulence
and political experimentation. And while the
prospects for the survival or revival of democratic
practices vary widely throughout the area, the
chances arc that the bulk of this experimentation will
focus on differing forms of authoritarian rule.

The problems that US policy-makers will face in
attempting to cope with this situation in Southern
Europe will be delicate and complex. There is a
danger that new extremist dictatorships of either the
left or the right might emerge. Then, too, continued
political instability ah ne might breed xenophobic
nationalism. Either of these developments would
threaten US and NATO interests in the region
generally. Moreover, popular distaste for
authoritarian regimes of any sort (even those which
prove to be relatively enlightened and effective) is
likely to continue to run high in both the US and
Western Europe.

28

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0006001 70029-8

CONFIDENTIAL